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Abstract
Not-too-tight (NTT) debt limits are endogenous restrictions on debt that
prevent agents from defaulting and opting for a specified continuation utility,
while allowing for maximal credit expansion (Alvarez and Jermann 2000). For
an agent facing some fixed prices for the Arrow securities, we prove that dis-
counted NTT debt limits must differ by a martingale. Discounted debt limits
are submartingales/martingales under an interdiction to trade/borrow, and
can be supermartingales under a temporary interdiction to trade. With high
interest rates and borrowing limited by the agent’s ability to repay debt out of
his future endowments, nonpositive NTT debt limits are unique. With low in-
terest rates, bubbles limited by the size of the total martingale components in
debt limits can be sustained in equilibrium. Bubbles arise in response to debt
limits more restrictive (at the prevailing interest rates) than the total amount
of self-enforcing debt allowed by the underlying enforcement limitations.
1 Introduction
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) construct a theory of endogenous debt constraints in
complete markets economies with limited enforcement of financial contracts. Follow-
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ing Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996), they assume that agents can
default on debt at the cost of being excluded permanently from financial markets.
At each date and state, an agent is allowed to borrow the maximum amount which is
self-enforcing (making repayment individually rational). These endogenous bounds
on debt are referred to as debt limits that are not-too-tight (NTT) for the respective
agent.
Kocherlakota (2008) uncovered a defining characteristic of the set of NTT debt
limits for an agent facing a fixed pricing kernel (or, equivalently, fixed prices of the
one-period Arrow securities at each date and state) and penalty for default: adding
a martingale to some discounted NTT debt limits results in bounds that are also
NTT. The proof is immediate, and is a consequence of agent’s budget constraint
being unchanged under the martingale-inflated bounds, if the initial value of the
martingale is added to his initial wealth.
We prove the converse, which is considerably more involved. A pair of discounted
debt limits that are NTT (for a given agent, pricing kernel and penalties for default)
must differ by a martingale.1 This theorem does not depend on equilibrium con-
siderations and stems only from the optimizing behavior of the agent. We allow
for general penalties for default specified by a continuation utility that can be date
and state contingent, and can depend on endogenous variables such as asset prices.
When the punishment for default is the interdiction to borrow, Hellwig and Lorenzoni
(2009a) proved that discounted NTT debt limits are martingales. With this outside
option, zero bounds on debt are NTT. Thus their result can be seen as a special case
of our theorem.2
This characterization of the NTT debt limits (for an agent facing a given pricing
kernel and penalties for default) can be used to establish their uniqueness, when the
present value of agent’s endowments is finite, that is with high interest rates. In this
case, borrowing should be limited by the agent’s ability to repay his debt out of his
future endowments (Santos and Woodford 1997), or equivalently, by the present value
of future endowments. The difference of two such nonpositive discounted NTT debt
1Let p and φ¯, φ be stochastic processes representing the pricing kernel and two (sequences of)
NTT debt limits. Then p · (φ− φ¯) is a martingale.
2Indeed, set φ¯ identically equal to zero at all dates and states. Hence φ¯ is NTT, and the debt
limits φ are NTT if and only p · φ (= p(φ− φ¯)) is a martingale.
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limits is therefore a uniformly integrable martingale converging to zero, and hence
identically equal to zero. When the punishment for default is the interdiction to trade,
Alvarez and Jermann (2000, Proposition 4.11) prove that nonpositive NTT debt
limits bounded by the present value of debt must exist. Our result establishes that
such debt limits are in fact unique. With an interdiction to borrow as punishment
for default, debt limits identically equal to zero are NTT, hence uniqueness implies
that debt is unsustainable in the presence of high interest rates. This confirms the
conclusion reached earlier by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni
(2009a).
The assumption of high interest rates is ad-hoc and extremely restrictive in mod-
els with limited enforcement. In these environments, low interest rates (making the
present value of aggregate endowment infinite) arise in equilibrium as a way to in-
duce agents not to renege on their debt. Such examples are provided in Hellwig
and Lorenzoni (2009a) for penalties resulting in an interdiction to borrow, and by
Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007) for an interdiction to trade. An adaptation
of the theorems of Santos and Woodford (1997) to economies with nonpositive debt
constraints as we have here (see Bidian 2011, Chapter 2), rather than borrowing
constraints, shows that low interest rates are necessary for the existence of asset
price bubbles. The martingale property of NTT debt limits suggests a strong con-
nection to bubbles, as they grow on average at the same rate as the interest rates
and therefore they are positive martingales when discounted by the pricing kernel.
By not discarding low interest rates on a priori grounds, we are able to pursue this
connection.
Kocherlakota (2008) shows that an arbitrary bubble can be injected in the price
of an infinitely-lived asset, without altering agents’ consumption. This can be accom-
plished by an upward adjustment of agents’ debt limits proportional to the size of the
bubble and their initial endowment of the asset, which leaves them NTT. The intro-
duction of a bubble gives consumers a windfall proportional to their initial holding of
the asset, which can be sterilized, leaving their budgets unaffected, by an appropriate
tightening of the debt limits. He refers to this result as the “bubble equivalence the-
orem”. While an intriguing way to generate bubbles, it raises the question whether
the tighter debt bounds needed to sustain the bubble can remain nonpositive, due to
the bubble component they now contain. Clearly arbitrary large bubble injections
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can only be sustained by forcing agents to save arbitrary large amounts. Moreover,
with high interest rates, even initially infinitesimal bubbles explode quickly and make
agents’s debt limits positive. Therefore it is unclear whether bubble injections can
occur at all with nonpositive debt limits. Positive debt limits force agents to save
and seem unreasonable given the presence of enforcement limitations.
We impose nonpositivity of debt limits as an equilibrium requirement. We show
that the necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to sustain bubbles is
the existence of (negative) martingale components in agents’ discounted debt limits.
A bubble of size equal to the total martingale component in agents’ debt bounds can
be injected in equilibrium. Thus the amount of self-enforcing debt restricts the size
of a potential bubble. Rational bubbles enable agents to circumvent tight debt limits
and to achieve identical allocations to those possible under more relaxed, but still
self-enforcing debt limits. Our characterization of NTT debt limits (Theorem 3.5)
implies that low interest rates and asset price bubbles must occur in any equilibrium
with debt limits that are tighter than maximal self-enforcing levels of debt at the
prevailing interest rates.
The type of penalty for default determines the shape of debt limits and the ex-
istence of martingale components in them. When agents are allowed to borrow pre-
determined fixed fractions (possibly zero) of their endowments following default, an
equilibrium can sustain bubbles whenever the equilibrium did sustain debt amounts
in excess of the penalty levels, since by our theorem, the difference between the
equilibrium and the penalty (discounted) debt limits is a martingale. In particular,
for the interdiction to borrow case, agents’ discounted debt limits are martingales,
and an equilibrium can sustain bubbles in assets in unit supply equal to the total
amount of self-enforcing debt (agents’ total debt limits). When the punishment for
default is the interdiction to trade, we prove that the discounted NTT debt limits
of each agent are submartingales, and therefore bubbles can be sustained whenever
total amount of self-enforcing debt does not vanish in present value terms. A bubble
of initial size equal to the limit of discounted total debt limits can be sustained (for
an asset in unit supply).
We present an example in which we describe the equilibria under three types
of penalties for default. With an interdiction to trade, respectively borrow, total
discounted debt is a submartingale with nonzero limit, respectively a nonzero mar-
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tingale. With a temporary (one-period) interdiction to trade, discounted debt limits
are supermartingales, containing martingales components. Therefore bubbles can be
sustained under all three types of punishments for default. They are a robust and
intrinsic feature of economies where restrictions on debt arise endogenously from
enforcement limitations. The example illustrates that there is a complex interac-
tion between the severity of the punishment for default, interest rates, the amount
of risk sharing and the shape of endogenous debt limits. The amount of equilib-
rium risk-sharing is not necessarily comonotonic with the (initial) size of sustainable
bubbles.
The type of bubbles shown to exist in this paper develop in response to artificially
tight credit restrictions at given interest rates (compared to what the underlying
enforcement limitations allow). They are a mechanism to preserve the same amount
of risk-sharing as afforded by maximal self-enforcing debt limits (at the existing
interest rates). Therefore bubbles in this framework are associated to inefficiencies
only insofar as the enforcement limitations induce inefficient levels of interest rates
and risk sharing in the absence of bubbles. Our example suggests that low interest
rates equilibria that can sustain bubbles are not necessarily (constrained) inefficient.
They are inefficient for a permanent or temporary interdiction to trade, even though
this might be just a byproduct of the stationarity of agents’ endowments, as pointed
out by Bloise and Reichlin (2011).3 An interdiction to borrow can lead to both
efficient and inefficient equilibria that can sustain bubbles.
The empirical testing and calibration of models with limited enforcement focused
solely on constrained efficient equilibria with high interest rates, by following the lead
set in foundational theoretical work by Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001) and Alvarez
and Jermann (2000). Alvarez and Jermann (2001) argue that these models deliver
too much risk sharing since the resulting pricing kernels are still not volatile enough
to explain the equity premium puzzle. Krueger and Perri (2006) also find excessive
risk sharing, which can only partially account for the rise in consumption inequality
in US. In our example, the equilibria with low interest rates result in less risk sharing
than the equilibrium with high interest rates, and by supporting bubbles, they can
3They construct an example, similar to ours, but with nonstationary endowments, where an
efficient allocation is supported as an equilibrium with low interest rates (under a permanent inter-
diction to trade after default).
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also explain a variety of asset pricing puzzles (Bejan and Bidian 2012). Therefore,
allowing for low interest rates has the potential to improve the risk sharing and
asset pricing implications of models with limited enforcement. Testing directly for
the presence of low interest rates is empirically challenging, and a discussion of the
literature is given by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009a). Indirectly, one can test for the
presence of bubbles in asset prices, which can arise only under low interest rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and defines the
notion of an Alvarez-Jermann equilibrium, which is a sequential equilibrium where
agents are subject to NTT debt limits. In Section 3 we prove that discounted NTT
bounds (for a given agent, pricing kernel and penalties for default) are determined
only up to a martingale. In Section 4 we give necessary and sufficient conditions for
an AJ-equilibrium to sustain bubbles, and show that an interdiction to trade/borrow
results in discounted NTT debt limits that are submartingales/martingales. Section
5 contains an example, in which equilibria that can sustain bubbles are constructed
for the case where the penalty for default is the permanent or temporary (one-
period) interdiction to trade, or the interdiction to borrow. Appendices A and B
contain omitted proofs in Section 3 and 5. Appendix C discusses the efficiency of the
equilibria in Section 5. The Supplemental Material (Bidian and Bejan 2012) con-
tains three parts. The first part establishes necessary and sufficient transversality
conditions for an agent’s optimization problem. They are extensions to stochastic
environments of the conditions given by Kocherlakota (1992), or alternatively, ex-
tensions to nonzero debt constraints of the corresponding conditions in Forno and
Montrucchio (2003). The second part presents an elementary proof of Theorem 3.5
for the case when debt constraints bind in bounded time, that requires no martin-
gale techniques or boundedness assumptions on the discounted debt limits. The
third part complements results in Section 5.1, showing that all the equilibria that
can sustain bubbles under an interdiction to trade can be achieved from fixed, zero
initial wealth for the agents.
2 The model
We consider a stochastic, discrete-time, infinite horizon economy. The time periods
are indexed by the set of natural numbers N := {0, 1, . . .}. The uncertainty is
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described by a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and by the filtration (Ft)t∈N, which is an
increasing sequence of σ-algebras on the set of states of the world Ω generating F ,
that is such that F = σ(∪tFt). Each σ-algebra Ft is interpreted as the information
available at period t and is finite. There is no initial information, therefore F0 =
{∅,Ω}. For ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ N, the set of states that are known to be possible at t if
the true state is ω is Ft(ω) := ∩{A ∈ Ft | ω ∈ A}, and is assumed to have positive
probability.4
A sequence x = (xt)t∈N of random variables (F -measurable real-valued functions)
is an adapted stochastic process (“process” henceforth) if for each t ∈ N, xt is Ft-
measurable.5 We let X be the set of all stochastic processes, and denote by X+ the
processes x ∈ X such that xt ≥ 0 P -almost surely (“a.s.” henceforth) for all t ∈ N.
We write x ≥ 0 if x is a nonnegative process, and x = 0 if xt = 0 P -a.s. for all
t ∈ N. We write x 6= 0 if there exists t such that xt = 0 does not hold (that is,
xt differs from zero on a set of positive probability). All statements, equalities, and
inequalities involving random variables are assumed to hold only P -a.s., and we omit
this qualifier in what follows. When K,L ∈ N \ {0}, let XK×L be the set of vector
(or matrix) processes (xij)1≤i≤K,1≤j≤L with x
ij ∈ X. For x ∈ XK×L, we write x ≥ 0
(respectively x > 0, x = 0) if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ L and t ∈ N, xijt ≥ 0
(respectively xijt > 0, x
ij
t = 0). We write x 6= 0 if there exist t, i, j such that x
i,j
t = 0
does not hold (that is, xi,jt differs from zero on a set of positive probability). Similarly
x 	 0 means that x ≥ 0 but x 6= 0. The set of nonnegative processes x ∈ XK×L
(that is, such that x ≥ 0) is denoted by XK×L+ .
A function T : Ω → N ∪ {∞} such that {T = n} ∈ Fn, for all n ∈ N, is called
a stopping time. The stopping time T is said to be finite if T < ∞, and bounded if
there exists n ∈ N such that T < n. A stopping time T induces the σ-algebra FT of
events known at T ,
FT := {A ∈ F | A ∩ {T = n} ∈ Fn for all n ∈ N} .
4Using the usual “event tree” terminology, Ft(ω) is the date t node containing state (“leaf”) ω
(for the parallel between the stochastic processes and event tree language, see Leroy and Werner
2001, chapter 21).
5Notice that the process x is integrable, since for any t ∈ N, xt belongs to the space of integrable
random variables L1 := L1(Ω,F , P ), as Ft is finite.
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The operator ET (·) denotes the conditional expectation with respect to FT . Let
x = (xn) ∈ X and T a finite stopping time. The random variable xT is defined
as xT (ω) := xT (ω)(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω. The process x starting at T is defined as the
sequence of random variables (xT+n)
∞
n=0, which we denote also by Θ
Tx (hence Θ is
the familiar shift operator). By extension, if A ⊂ X, then ΘTA := {ΘTx | x ∈ A}.
Let S be another stopping time, not necessarily finite, such that T ≤ S. The process
x stopped at S and starting at T is defined as the sequence of random variables
(x(T+n)∧S)
∞
n=0, where (T + n) ∧ S is an abbreviated notation for min{T + n, S}. We
use also the alternative notation (xn)
S
n=T for the process x stopped at S and starting
at T .
There is a single consumption good and a finite number, I, of consumers. An
agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} has endowments ei ∈ X+, and his preferences are represented
by a utility U i : X+ → R given by U i(c) = E
∑∞
t=0 u
i
t(ct), where u
i
t(·) = β
i
tu
i(·)
and E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the probability P . We assume
that βi ∈ X+ and satisfies E
∑
t≥0 β
i
t < ∞, and that u
i : R+ → R is continuous,
increasing, strictly concave and bounded from above by u¯i ∈ R and from below by
ui ∈ R. The conditional expectation given the information available at t, Ft, is
denoted by Et(·). Given the absence of information at period 0, E0(·) = E(·). Let
U it (c) := Et
∑
s≥t u
i
s(cs) be the continuation utility of agent i after t provided by a
consumption stream c ∈ X+.
Each consumer can trade at each date and state a complete set of one-period
Arrow securities. Their prices determine uniquely the pricing kernel p ∈ X++, and
conversely, the pricing kernel p determines unambiguously the prices of the Arrow se-
curities.6 Additionally, there is a finite number J of infinitely-lived, disposable securi-
ties. Asset j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} pays dividends dj ∈ X+, and has an ex-dividend price per
share qj ∈ X+. The dividend and price vector processes are d := (d
1, . . . , dJ) ∈ X1×J+
and q := (q1, . . . , qJ) ∈ X1×J+ . Consumer i has an initial endowment θ
i
−1 ∈ R
J
+ of the
infinitely-lived securities, and ai0 ∈ R additional wealth, and his trading strategy in
the J securities is represented by a process θi ∈ XJ×1, while his trading strategy in
the Arrow securities is given by a ∈ X.
Consumer i faces debt constraints requiring his beginning of period financial
6The price at date t− 1 and state ω ∈ Ω of the Arrow security paying one unit of consumption
at t in states Ft(ω) is related to the pricing kernel p by the formula
pt(ω)
pt−1(ω)
· P (Ft(ω))
P (Ft−1(ω))
.
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wealth to exceed some bounds φi ∈ X, meant to prevent Ponzi schemes. Thus if
consumer i starts at a finite stopping time T with wealth νT (FT -measurable) and
faces constraints φi and prices p, q, he solves the problem max(c,a,θ)∈Bi
T
(νT ,φi,p,q) U
i
T (c),
denoted P iT (νT , φ
i, p, q), where BiT (νT , φ, p, q) is his budget constraint following T ,
defined as
BiT (νT ,φ
i, p, q) := {(c, a, θ) ∈ ΘTX+ ×Θ
T+1X ×ΘTXJ×1 |
cT + ET
pT+1
pT
aT+1 + qT θT ≤ e
i
T + νT , as + (qs + ds)θs−1 ≥ φ
i
s,
cs + Es
ps+1
ps
as+1 + qsθs ≤ e
i
s + as + (qs + ds)θs−1,∀s > T}. (2.1)
The indirect utility of the agent is given by
V iT (νT , φ
i, p, q) := max
(c,a,θ)∈Bi
T
(νT ,φi,p,q)
U iT (c). (2.2)
Consumer i can elect to default on his debt and receive a continuation utility
described by a process V i,d. Thus by defaulting at period t, agent i can guarantee
for himself a continuation utility V i,dt (which is Ft-measurable) and can depend on
exogenous variables such as agents’ endowments, but also on prices p, q, and even
future debt limits φit+1, φ
i
t+2, . . .. When we need to emphasize the functional depen-
dence of penalties on prices and debt limits we use the full notation V i,d(p, q, φi),
but in most instances we drop the arguments and do not make the dependence ex-
plicit. The debt constraints φi are determined endogenously to reflect the maximal
amount of debt agents can hold without defaulting. We say that the debt limits φi
are self-enforcing for agent i at prices p, q given penalties V i,d if Bt(φt, φ, p, q) 6= ∅
for all t ∈ N and the agent prefers not to default, V it (φt, φ, p, q) ≥ V
i,d
t ,∀t ∈ N. The
debt limits φi are not-too-tight (NTT) for agent i (at prices p, q) given penalties V i,d
if and only if
V it (φt, φ, p, q) = V
i,d
t ,∀t ∈ N. (2.3)
Thus NTT debt limits are self-enforcing bounds that do not restrict credit unnec-
essarily. Alvarez and Jermann (2000), building on the work of Kehoe and Levine
9
(1993), assume that the agents are banned from trading following default, that is
V i,dt := U
i
t (e
i),∀t ∈ N. (2.4)
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009a), following Bulow and Rogoff (1989), allow agents
to continue to lend, but not to borrow, upon default. Hence agents can renege
on their debt and be required to hold nonnegative wealth thereafter, resulting in a
continuation utility that depends on prices,
V i,dt := V
i
t (0, 0, p, q),∀t ∈ N, (2.5)
where the second argument in Vt(0, 0, p, q) denotes the process equal to zero at any
date and state.
A vector
(
p, q, (ci)Ii=1, (a
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1, (φ
i)Ii=1, (V
i,d)Ii=1
)
consisting of a pricing ker-
nel p, prices q for the infinitely-lived securities, consumption (ci), trading strategies
(ai) (in Arrow securities) and (θi) (in the infinitely-lived securities), debt constraints
(φi) and penalties for default (V i,d) is an AJ-equilibrium with initial securities hold-
ings (θi−1)
I
i=1 and initial additional wealth (a
i
0)
I
i=1 if
i. Consumption and portfolios of each agent i are feasible and optimal: (ci, ai, θi) ∈
Bi0(a
i
0 + (q0 + d0)θ
i
−1, φ
i, p, q) and U(ci) = V i0 (a
i
0 + (q0 + d0)θ
i
−1, φ
i, p, q).
ii. Markets clear:
∑I
i=1 c
i
t =
∑I
i=1 e
i
t,
∑I
i=1 θ
i
t =
∑I
i=1 θ
i
−1,
∑I
i=1 a
i
t = 0,∀t ≥ 0.
iii. For each i, φi is NTT given V i,d: V it (φ
i
t, φ
i, p, q) = V i,dt , for all t ≥ 0.
A pricing kernel p and security prices q under which the problem of an agent
admits a solution have to exclude arbitrage opportunities, which implies that (see
for example Bidian 2011, Chapter 2)
qt = Et
pt+1
pt
(qt+1 + dt+1),∀t ≥ 0. (2.6)
Therefore qt =
1
pt
Et
∑
s>t psds + limn→∞
1
pt
Etpnqn. Let ft(p, d) :=
1
pt
Et
∑
s>t psds
denote the discounted present value at t of future dividends d, that is the fundamental
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value of d at period t. It follows that
bt(p, q) :=
1
pt
lim
n→∞
Etpnqn (2.7)
is well-defined and nonnegative, and qt = ft(p, d) + bt(p, q). The process b(p, q)
represents the part of asset prices in excess of fundamental values, and represents
the bubble component in the asset prices q. Notice that for all t ∈ N, ptbt(p, q) =
Etpt+1bt+1(p, q). Hence p · b(p, q) is a nonnegative martingale,
7 and b(p, q) = 0 if and
only if 0 = b0(p, q) (=
1
p0
limt→∞Eptqt).
3 Characterization of not-too-tight debt limits
There is an intimate connection between NTT debt limits and martingales, which will
be explored here. Throughout this section we fix an agent i facing a given pricing
kernel p, prices q for the infinitely-lived securities, and penalties for default V i,d.
We assume that prices p, q exclude arbitrage opportunities, that is they satisfy (2.6).
Thus the optimizing agent is concerned only with his total wealth at the beginning of
each period, rather than the composition of wealth (infinitely-lived securities versus
Arrow securities). If (ci, ai, θi) ∈ BiT (νT , φ
i, p, q), then (c, a′) ∈ BiT (νT , φ
i, p), where
for all s > T , a′s := as + (qs + ds)θ
i
s−1 (that is, a
′
s is the beginning of period s wealth
of the agent), and
BiT (νT , φ
i, p) :={(c, a) ∈ ΘTX+ ×Θ
TX |aT = νT , (3.1)
cT+t + ET+t
pT+t+1
pT+t
aT+t+1 ≤ e
i
T+t + aT+t, aT+t+1 ≥ φ
i
T+t+1,∀t ≥ 0}.
Therefore we focus here on the simpler budgets of the form (3.1), in which we can
imagine that the agent is choosing directly the (beginning of period) wealth hold-
ings. We denote the problem max(c,a)∈Bi
T
(νT ,φi,p) U
i
T (c) by P
i
t (νT , φ
i, p), the optimal
solution to the problem P iT (νT , φ
i, p) is denoted by CiT (νT , φ
i, p), and the maximum
7A process m ∈ X is a martingale if mt = Etmt+1, for all t ≥ 0, while m is a submartingale
(respectively supermartingale) if mt ≤ Etmt+1 (respectively mt ≥ Etmt+1) for all t ≥ 0.
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continuation utility attainable by the agent is V iT (νT , φ
i, p), that is
CiT (νT , φ
i, p) := argmax(c,a)∈Bi
T
(νT ,φi,p)
U iT (c), (3.2)
V iT (νT , φ
i, p) := max
(c,a)∈Bi
T
(νT ,φi,p)
U iT (c). (3.3)
As a consequence of the equivalence of the budgets BiT (νT , φ
i, p, q) and BiT (νT , φ
i, p)
(from the point of view of consumption), the consumption component in CiT (νT , φ
i, p, q)
and CiT (νT , φ
i, p) coincide, and
V iT (νT , φ
i, p, q) = V iT (νT , φ
i, p). (3.4)
We henceforth drop the last argument (q) in the indirect utility of the agent, as
arbitrage opportunities are absent in an equilibrium.
We drop also the agent-specific superscript i for the rest of the section, since we
focus on a single agent. We assume that φ¯ ∈ X are some NTT bounds (for the
chosen agent, at prices p and penalties V d), and that φ ∈ X are some alternative
debt limits, satisfying Bt(φt, φ, p) 6= ∅, for all t. Some of the results of this section
require the following assumption on φ¯, φ:
V d(p, q, φ) = V d(p, q, φ¯), (3.5)
that is, continuation utilities after default are the same under the two debt limits.
Condition 3.5 is clearly satisfied for penalties such as (2.4) and (2.5) since they do
not depend on agent’s debt limits. Set
M := p(φ− φ¯). (3.6)
We show next that discounted NTT constraints are determined only up to a martin-
gale, that is we prove that φ are NTT (for the given agent at prices p and penalties
V d) if and only if M is a martingale. The “if” part (sufficiency) is immediate, and
was shown by Kocherlakota (2008) (for less general penalties for default).
Proposition 3.1. If M is a martingale, then Vt(φ¯t, φ¯, p) = Vt(φt, φ, p) for all t ∈ N
and therefore φ are NTT if (3.5) holds.
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Proof. It is immediate to check that (c, a) ∈ Bt(φ¯t, φ¯, p) if and only if (c, a+φ− φ¯) ∈
Bt(φt, φ, p). Thus for all t ∈ N, Vt(φ¯t, φ¯, p) = Vt(φt, φ, p) = V d(φ), and equal also to
V d(φ¯) under the additional assumption V d(p, q, φ) = V d(p, q, φ¯), thus φ¯ is NTT.
The next result is related.
Proposition 3.2. If M is a supermartingale, then for any t ≥ 0, Vt(φt, φ, p) ≥
Vt(φ¯t, φ¯, p) with strict inequality on the set {Mt > EtMt+1}.
Proof. It is immediate to check that if (c, a) ∈ Bt(φ¯t, φ¯, p), then (c˜, a + φ − φ¯) ∈
Bt(φt, φ, p), where c˜s := cs + Es (Ms −Ms+1) /ps ≥ cs, for all s ≥ t. Since c˜t > ct on
{Mt > EtMt+1}, the conclusion follows.
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009a) proved that the converse of Proposition 3.1 holds,
for the particular case (2.5) when agents are not allowed to borrow following default.
They prove that if φ are NTT, then p · φ is a martingale. Since in their framework
φ¯ := 0 are NTT, their result states that p(φ − φ¯)(= M) is a martingale. We prove
that this is the case, for general penalties V d satisfying (3.5).
Let T be an arbitrary stopping time. Define α(T ) to be the first time the bounds
φ bind after T , when the agent starts with wealth φT at T and faces bounds φ.
Concretely, for each ω ∈ {T <∞},
α(T )(ω) := inf {t | t ∈ N, t > T (ω), at(ω) = φt(ω), (c, a) ∈ CT (φT , φ, p)} , (3.7)
and for ω ∈ {T = ∞}, α(T )(ω) := ∞. Notice that α(T ) is well-defined, as the
set CT (φT , φ, p) contains a unique element. Indeed, strict concavity of the period
utilities (ut) imply that if if (c, a), (c
′, a′) ∈ CT (φT , φ, p), then c = c
′, otherwise
((c + c′)/2, (a + a′)/2) ∈ BT (φT , φ, p) would be strictly preferred by the agent to
both (c, a) and (c′, a′). But then for any s ≥ T , Vs(as, φs, p) = Us(c) = Us(c
′) =
Vs(a
′
s, φ, p), hence as = a
′
s (Vs is strictly increasing), and therefore (c, a) = (c
′, a′).
With multiple optimal paths (without strict concavity), our arguments would go
through, but we would have to be explicit about which optimal path is selected in
the definition of α(T ). We also set α0(T ) := T and for k ≥ 1, we define αk(T )
recursively as αk(T ) := α(αk−1(T )).
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We present next two ancillary results. First, optimal asset holdings of an agent
are nondecreasing in initial wealth. Secondly, for any period t, the processM stopped
at α(t) converges almost surely. Proofs are in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.3. Given any t ∈ N and Ft-measurable random variables ν ′ ≥ ν,
(c, a) ∈ Ct(ν, φ, p), (c
′, a′) ∈ Ct(ν
′, φ, p) ⇒ a′s ≥ as,∀s ≥ t. (3.8)
Proposition 3.4. Let t ∈ N. For n ∈ N, let ηn := α(t)∧n. If supn≥tEt(pηnφηn)
+ <
∞,8 then (pηnφηn)n∈N converges a.s. If, additionally, supn≥tEt
(
pηnφ¯ηn
)−
<∞, then
(Mηn)n∈N converges a.s.
We impose the following boundedness conditions on φ, φ¯.
Assumption 3.1. For each t ∈ N, supn≥tEt(pηnφηn)
+ < ∞, supn≥tEt(pηnφ¯ηn)
− <
∞, where ηn := α(t) ∧ n, and (Ms)
α(t)
s=t is uniformly integrable and has a uniformly
integrable lower Snell envelope.
The lower Snell envelope of a uniformly integrable process represents the largest
submartingale less or equal to the process. While Assumption 3.1 seems hard to
verify, it always holds under the following (stronger) condition:
Assumption 3.2. For each t ∈ N, the processes (p·φ)α(t)s=t and (p·φ¯)
α(t)
s=t are dominated
by an integrable random variable, that is supn≥t |pηnφηn| ∈ L
1, supn≥t |pηnφ¯ηn| ∈ L
1,
where ηn := α(t) ∧ n.
Indeed, Assumption 3.2 guarantees that infn≥tMα(t)∧n > −∞, and therefore the
process (Ms)
α(t)
s=t has a lower Snell envelope (Kopp 1984, Theorem 2.11.3). Moreover
the uniform integrability conditions required by Assumption 3.1 are satisfied under
the stronger dominance conditions in Assumption 3.2. The technical boundedness
conditions reflected in the above assumptions are needed to insure that the order
of limits and expectations can be exchanged. They are very week, since they are
imposed piecewise on time intervals (t, α(t) + 1), rather than on the whole horizon.
8For x ∈ R, x+ and x− denote the positive and negative part of x, x+ := −(−x ∧ 0) and
x− := −(x ∧ 0).
14
Therefore if debt limits bind in bounded time, Assumption 3.2 is automatically sat-
isfied. In Section 5.3, we construct an equilibrium9 in which each agent’s discounted
debt limits p · φ are supermartingales converging to −∞, and therefore p · φ is not
dominated by an integrable random variable. However, in that example α(t) ≤ t+2
for all t, therefore Assumption 3.2 is trivially satisfied.
We can prove now (the harder) converse to Proposition 3.1, which completes the
characterization of NTT debt limits.
Theorem 3.5. If φ¯, φ are NTT (given p, q, V d) and (3.5) and Assumption 3.1 hold,
then the process M := p(φ− φ¯) is a martingale.
Proof. Fix a natural number t.
STEP 1. We show that
Mt ≥ EtMα(t), (3.9)
whereMα(t) := limn→∞Mα(t)∧n, which is well-defined by Proposition 3.4. To this end,
let (Mˆs)
α(t)
s=t be the (lower) Snell envelope of (Ms)
α(t)
s=t , that is Mˆs := infs≤T<α(t)+1EsMT ,
for t ≤ s < α(t) (Kopp 1984, Theorem 2.11.3).10 It is the largest submartingale
dominated from above by M (that is Mˆ ≤ M), and it satisfies Mˆs = Ms ∧ EsMˆs+1
and Et(Mˆs) = infs≤T<α(t)+1EtMT . Hence there exist a sequence of stopping times
(Tn) such that Tn ր α(t) and Mˆt = limn→∞EtMTn = Et limn→∞MTn = EtMα(t).
Moreover, since (Mˆs)
α(t)
s=t is a uniformly integrable submartingale smaller than M ,
Mˆα(t) := limn→∞ Mˆα(t)∧n exists, Mˆα(t) ≤Mα(t) and Mˆt ≤ EtMˆα(t). We conclude that
Mˆα(t) = Mα(t). (3.10)
We prove that (Mˆs)
α(t)
s=t is in fact a martingale, rather than just a submartingale.
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists n ∈ N such that {t ≤ n < α(t)}∩{Mˆn <
EnMˆn+1} has positive probability. Until we reach a contradiction, all statements
below are restricted to the set {t ≤ n < α(t)} ∩ {Mˆn < EnMˆn+1} (which is Fn-
measurable). Notice that Mˆn = Mn, since Mˆn = Mn ∧ EnMˆn+1 and Mˆn < EnMˆn+1.
9The penalty for default is a one-period interdiction to trade, see (5.2).
10The infimum in the definition of Mˆs refers to the essential infimum over all finite stopping
times T greater than s and smaller or equal to α(t) (Kopp 1984, Proposition 2.11.1).
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Let (c, a) ∈ Cn(φn, φ, p). Define (a˜s)
α(t)
s=n+1 by
a˜s := as −
Mˆs
ps
≥ φs −
Ms
ps
= φs − (φs − φ¯s) = φ¯s,
and let a˜n = φ¯n. Let (c˜s)
α(t)−1
s=n be the consumption supported by asset holdings a˜,
thus ps(c˜s − cs) = ps(a˜s − as)− Esps+1(a˜s+1 − as+1). Hence
pn(c˜n − cn) = −Mn + EnMˆn+1 = −Mˆn + EnMˆn+1 > 0,
ps(c˜s − cs) = −Mˆs + EsMˆs+1 ≥ 0, n+ 1 ≤ s < α(t).
We reached a contradiction, since
V dn = Vn(φ¯n, φ¯, p) ≥ En
α(t)−1∑
s=n
us(c˜s) + V
d
α(t)1α(t)<∞

> En
α(t)−1∑
s=n
us(cs) + V
d
α(t)1α(t)<∞
 = Vn(φn, φ, p) = V dn .
Having established that Mˆ is a martingale, (3.9) follows now from (3.10).
STEP 2. We show that
Mt = EtMα(t). (3.11)
For each k ∈ N, repeat the construction in STEP 1 for αk(t) instead of t, on the
set where {αk(t) < ∞}, and obtain the martingale (Mˆs)
αk+1(t)
s=αk(t)+1
(the lower Snell
envelope of (Ms)
αk+1(t)
s=αk(t)+1
), dominated from above by M and such that Mˆαk+1(t) =
Mαk+1(t).
11 We let also Mˆt := EtMˆα(t). By (3.9), the resulting process (Mˆs)
∞
s=t is a
supermartingale, Mˆ ≤M , and for all k ≥ 1, Mˆαk(t) = Mαk(t).
Construct the process (φˆ)∞s=t defined by φˆs := φ¯s+Mˆs/ps. It follows that φs ≥ φˆs
for all s ≥ t, and φˆαk(t) = φαk(t) for all k ≥ 1. Let (c¯, a¯) ∈ Ct(φt, φ, p). Then
(c¯, a¯) satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker and necessary transversality conditions (Bidian and
11Equivalently, for αk(t) + 1 ≤ s < αk+1(t) + 1 define Mˆs := EsMαk+1(t) and use repeatedly the
property (3.8) and (3.9) to show that Mˆ ≤M .
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Bejan 2012, Lemma 1.1)
u′s(c¯s)
u′s+1(c¯s+1)
−
ps
ps+1
≥ 0,
(
u′s(c¯s)
u′s+1(c¯s+1)
−
ps
ps+1
)
(a¯s+1 − φs+1) = 0,∀s ≥ t, (3.12)
lim
T→∞
Etβ
Tu′(c¯T )(a¯T − φT ) = 0. (3.13)
We claim that (c¯, a¯) is an optimal solution for the problem Pt(φt, φˆ, p) with relaxed
debt limits, that is we show that (c¯, a¯) ∈ Ct(φt, φˆ, p). Since a¯ binds at the same dates
and states under the φ and φˆ bounds, it follows that (c¯, a¯) satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for the problem Pt(φt, φˆ, p). Let (c, a) ∈ Bt(φt, φˆ, p) and ηn := α
k(t) ∧ n,
for k ≥ 1 and n ≥ t. By (3.12) and Lemma 1.2 in Bidian and Bejan (2012),
Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
(us(cs)− us(c¯s)) ≤ Etu
′
ηn
(c¯ηn)(a¯ηn − φˆηn) ≤
≤ Etu
′
ηn
(c¯ηn)(a¯ηn − φηn) +
pt
u′t(c¯t)
Etpηn(φηn − φˆηn) =
= Etu
′
n(c¯n)(a¯n − φn)1n≤αk(t) +
pt
u′t(c¯t)
Et(Mηn − Mˆηn), (3.14)
as (a¯ηn − φˆηn)1n>αk(t) = 0. Using (3.13),
lim
n→∞
Etu
′
n(c¯n)(a¯n − φn)1n≤αk(t) ≤ lim
n→∞
Etu
′
n(c¯n)(a¯n − φn) = 0,
and limn→∞Et(Mηn − Mˆηn) = 0 since Mˆαk(t) = Mαk(t) and Mˆ
αk(t),Mα
k(t) are uni-
formly integrable. Making n → ∞ in (3.14), Et
∑αk(t)−1
s=t (us(cs)− us(c¯s)) ≤ 0.
Letting k → ∞, we conclude that (c¯, a¯) ∈ Ct(φt, φˆ, p). Therefore Vt(φt, φˆ, p) =
Vt(φt, φ, p) = V
d
t , and
V dt = Vt(φt, φˆ, p) ≥ Vt(φˆt, φ
′, p) ≥ V dt .
The first inequality above is strict if φt > φˆt and the second one is strict if Mˆ is not
a martingale, but rather only a supermartingale, by Proposition 3.2. Thus Mˆ is a
martingale and φt = φˆt. Thus Mt = Mˆt = EtMα(t), and (3.11) obtains.
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STEP 3. We show that
Mt = EtMt+1. (3.15)
It is enough to prove that
Mt+1 = Et+1Mα(t), (3.16)
since then Mt = EtMα(t) = EtEt+1Mα(t) = EtMt+1, as desired. Let η
0 := t + 1 and
for m ≥ 1, ηm+1 := α(ηm) ∧ α(t). Thus ηm ր α(t). Fix l ∈ N. We show first that
Mηl = EηlMηl+1 . On the set {η
l < α(t)}, the monotonicity property (3.8) implies
that α(ηl) ≤ α(t), thus ηl+1 = α(ηl). By (3.11),
1ηl<α(t) · EηlMηl+1 = 1ηl<α(t) · EηlMα(ηl) = 1ηl<α(t) ·Mηl .
On the set {ηl = α(t)}, ηl+1 = ηl = α(t). Therefore
EηlMηl+1 = 1ηl<α(t) ·EηlMηl+1 +1ηl=α(t) ·EηlMηl = 1ηl<α(t) ·Mηl+1ηl=α(t) ·Mηl = Mηl .
Using the law of iterated expectations, it follows that
Mt+1 = Mη0 = Eη0Mη1 = . . . = Eη0Mηl = Et+1Mηl ,∀l ∈ N.
By the dominated convergence theorem,
Mt+1 = lim
l→∞
Et+1Mηl = Et+1 lim
l→∞
Mηl = Et+1Mα(t).
Therefore (3.16) holds and hence (3.15) is true, thus M is a martingale.
The idea of the proof is depicted in Figure 1. In Step 1 we construct the Snell
envelope of M on the interval [t, α(t)] (the largest submartingale smaller than M),
and show that it has to be in fact a martingale (otherwise the agent will default when
faced with debt limits φ). It follows that the process M sampled at t and α(t) is a
supermartingale. In Step 2, we construct in a similar fashion the Snell Envelope Mˆ for
the process M on the intervals [t, α(t)], (α(t), α2(t)], (α2(t), α3(t)], . . .. By Step 1, Mˆ
is a supermartingale. Using Mˆ , we construct the relaxed bounds φˆ := φ¯+ Mˆ/p ≤ φ,
which coincide with φ at α(t), α2(t), . . ., that is whenever φ are binding in the problem
Pt(φt, φ, p). Therefore the optimal solution for Pt(φt, φ, p) is also a solution of the
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t α(t) α2(t) α3(t)
M
Mˆ
Figure 1: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 3.5.
relaxed problem (with larger feasible set) Pt(φt, φˆ, p) if it satisfies the transversality
condition for the relaxed problem. We show that this is indeed the case, and by
Proposition 3.2, we conclude that φt = φˆt, and therefore the process M sampled at
t and α(t) is a martingale (rather than just a supermartingale, as shown in Step 1).
Since t was arbitrary, Step 3 uses an optional sampling type of argument in reverse,
and proves that M must be a martingale.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 3.5 is the uniqueness of nonpositive12
NTT debt limits that are bounded by the present value of agent’s future endowments,
assumed finite.
Proposition 3.6. For each t ∈ N, let Yt :=
1
pt
Et
∑
s≥t pses and assume Y0 <∞. Let
φ, φ¯ be NTT given V d and satisfying (3.5). If 0 ≥ φ, φ¯ ≥ −Y , then φ = φ¯.
Proof. Notice that the process p·Y is a uniformly integrable positive supermartingale
converging to zero a.s. and in L1. Thus Assumption 3.1 is satisfied with α(t) replaced
by ∞, and the conclusion follows by Theorem 3.5.
12Nonpositivity implies that there is no forced saving.
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In fact, because of the strong boundedness and convergence assumptions implicit
here, we can give also a direct proof for this proposition using only the first part
of the proof of Theorem 3.5. The processes p · φ, p · φ¯, M := p · (φ − φ¯) and
M ′ := p · (φ¯ − φ) = −M are bounded (in absolute value) from above by p · Y ,
and therefore they converge to zero a.s. and in L1 (being uniformly integrable).
Moreover the lower Snell envelopes of the processes M,M ′ exist, since M and M ′ are
bounded from below by the uniformly integrable submartingale −p · Y . Repeating
the argument in STEP 1 of Theorem 3.5, with α(t) replaced by ∞, it follows that
for all t ≥ 0, Mt ≥ Et limn→∞Mn = 0. In the same manner, with M
′ taking the
place of M , we infer that M ′ ≥ 0. Thus M = 0 and hence φ = φ¯.
Therefore with high interest rates and borrowing limited by the agent’s ability to
repay his debt out of his future endowments (Santos and Woodford 1997), nonposi-
tive NTT debt limits are unique (for a given agent, pricing kernel and penalties for
default). Proposition 3.6 fills some gaps and gives a unified view of results obtained
for various penalties for default. When the punishment for default is the interdiction
to trade, Alvarez and Jermann (2000, Proposition 4.11) prove that given any se-
quential equilibrium with NTT debt limits and high interest rates, one can construct
an equivalent equilibrium with identical pricing kernel and consumption, but with
nonpositive NTT debt limits bounded by the present value of aggregate endowment.
Proposition 3.6 shows that such debt limits are in fact unique. Moreover, when the
punishment for default is the loss of borrowing privileges, nonpositive NTT debt
limits restricted by the present value of future endowments must be identically equal
to zero, and therefore no borrowing can be sustained in an equilibrium, as pointed
out before by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009a).
The assumption of high interest rates is ad-hoc and extremely restrictive in models
with limited enforcement. In these environments, low interest rates arise in equilib-
rium as a way to induce agents not to default. In fact, in the next section, we show
that Theorem 3.5 implies that low interest rates and asset price bubbles must oc-
cur in any equilibrium with debt limits that are tighter than maximal self-enforcing
levels of credit at the prevailing interest rates. Rational bubbles enable agents to
circumvent tight debt limits and to achieve identical allocations to those possible
under more relaxed, but still self-enforcing debt limits.
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4 Bubble injections
The martingale characterization of NTT debts in Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.5
can be used to show that robust bubbles can arise in limited enforcement economies.
The self-enforcing debt that can be sustained in an equilibrium can be converted into
asset price bubbles. We compare pairs of AJ-equilibria, therefore to avoid lengthy
notation, we set E :=
(
p, q, (ci)Ii=1, (a
i)Ii=1, (θ
i)Ii=1, (φ
i)Ii=1, (V
i,d)Ii=1
)
, while E¯ , E˜ , Eˆ
denote similar vectors, with all variables barred, tilded, respectively hatted. We
say that the AJ-equilibria E , Eˆ are equivalent if pricing kernels, consumptions and
penalties for default coincide: pˆ = p, cˆi = ci, Vˆ i,d = V i,d, for all agents i.
Kocherlakota (2008) showed that an arbitrary bubble can be injected in an
infinitely-lived asset, while leaving agents’ budget constraints (hence consumption)
unchanged, as long as the debt constraints of the agents are allowed to be adjusted
upwards by their initial endowment of the asset multiplied by the bubble term.
The introduction of a bubble gives consumers a windfall proportional to their initial
holding of the asset, which can be sterilized, leaving their budgets unaffected, by
an appropriate tightening of the debt limits. He refers to this result as “the bubble
equivalence theorem”. The modified debt constraints bind in exactly the same dates
and states, and they are NTT if the initial bounds were NTT (in his paper, penalties
for default do not depend on asset prices or agents’ debt limits). The result goes
through in our framework with more general penalties for default, assuming that
they are not affected by the the addition of a bubble. Given a pricing kernel p, we
let M(p) be the set of nonnegative processes that are martingales when discounted
by p, M(p) := {ε ∈ X+|p · ε martingale }. Similarly, M
J(p) := (M(p))J ⊂ X1×J+ .
Proposition 4.1 (Kocherlakota 2008). Let E be an AJ-equilibrium without bubbles
and ε ∈ MJ(p). Assume that penalties V i,d of each agent i satisfy V i,d(p, q, φi) =
V i,d(p, qˆ, φˆi), where qˆ = q + ε and φˆi := φi + ε · θi−1. Then Eˆ is an equivalent AJ-
equilibrium having asset price bubbles given by ε, where for each agent i and each
period t ≥ 0, qˆ = q + ε, θˆit−1 = θ
i
t−1, aˆ
i
t := at + εt(θ
i
−1 − θ
i
t−1) and φˆ
i
t := φ
i
t + εt · θ
i
−1.
The proof is immediate and relies on the equality of agents’ budgets constraints
in E and Eˆ . Market clearing conditions are clearly satisfied. Bounds φˆi remain NTT
by Proposition 3.1, as V it (φˆ
i
t, φˆ
i, p) = V it (φ
i
t, φ
i, p) = V i,dt (p, q, φ
i) = V i,dt (p, qˆ, φˆ
i), for
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all t. An AJ-equilibrium E satisfies automatically the condition
V i,d(p, q, φi) = V i,d(p, q + ε, φi + ε · θi−1), ∀ε ∈M
J(p),∀i (4.1)
if the penalties for default do not depend on debt limits and prices (interdiction
to trade (2.4)), or if they don’t depend on debt limits and depend on prices only
through the pricing kernel (interdiction to borrow (2.5)). In Section 5.3 we analyze
an example with penalties for default (one-period interdiction to trade, see (5.2))
that depend on debt limits and asset prices, and which nevertheless satisfy (4.1).
Proposition 4.1 uses only the “easy” direction in the characterization of NTT
bounds of Section 3 (Proposition 3.1) and it can be applied to more general environ-
ments. If the long-lived securities dynamically complete the markets or if markets are
incomplete, then a bubble injection can alternatively be achieved through a change
in agents’ trading of infinitely-lived securities, rather than through an adjustment of
agents’ holdings of Arrow securities (Bejan and Bidian 2012, Theorem 2.3).
The bubble equivalence theorem did not receive the attention it deserves, since it
was universally assumed that the new (tighter) debt bounds (φˆi) required to sustain
the bubble injection in a positive supply asset must eventually become positive, due
to the bubble component they now contain, implying that agents are subjected to
forced saving. This is indeed the case in the presence of high interest rates that make
the present value of aggregate endowment finite. Intuitively, the bubble component
added to debt limits explodes and makes them positive eventually, since it grows on
average at the rate of interest. Formally, the claim follows by adapting the results
of Santos and Woodford (1997), derived for the case of borrowing constraints, to
economies with debt constraints. This is done in Bidian (2011, Chapter 2), where it
is shown that no bubbles can exist in assets in positive supply if the present value of
aggregate endowment is finite and if agents are subject to nonpositive debt limits.13
Therefore low interest rates (which make the present value of aggregate endowment
infinite) are a necessary condition for the tighter debt bounds (φˆi) of Proposition 4.1
to remain nonpositive when bubbles are added to assets in positive supply.
13Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009a) make the same point by appealing to the results of Santos
and Woodford (1997) on the nonexistence of bubbles. However, it is unclear how to apply Santos
and Woodford’s (1997) results to their environment with one-period assets, where bubbles are
impossible, and where agents are subject to debt rather than borrowing constraints.
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We subscribe to the view that debt limits have to be nonpositive, as forced saving
seems implausible with enforcement limitations. For the rest of the paper, we make
nonpositivity of debt limits a part of the definition of an AJ-equilibrium. Given an
AJ-equilibrium, we say that it can sustain bubbles (in assets in positive supply) if
there exists an equivalent equilibrium that has a bubble in one of the assets (in
positive supply). Proposition 4.1 seems to suggest that for an equilibrium to sustain
bubbles in positive supply assets, it must be the case that the discounted debt limits
of all agents that have nonzero endowments of the security must contain negative
martingale components. This condition is stronger than needed. The next result
develops necessary and sufficient conditions under which an equilibrium can sustain
bubbles, and characterizes the size of those bubbles. Bubbles can be sustained if and
only if at least one agent has discounted debt limits having a negative martingale
component. The size of the bubbles is limited by the total martingale components
in agents’ debt limits.
Proposition 4.2. Let E be an AJ-equilibrium with nonpositive debt limits and penal-
ties satisfying (4.1) in any equivalent equilibrium. Let ε,m1, . . . ,mI ∈M(p) such that
φi ≤ −mi for each agent i, and ε·
∑I
i=1 θ
i,j
−1 =
∑I
i=1m
i, for some asset j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
If ε 6= 0, there exists an equilibrium equivalent to E, with nonpositive debt limits and
in which the price of asset j is qj+ε, and therefore asset j has a bubble ε. Conversely,
if E has the bubble ε 6= 0 in the price of asset j, then there exists an equilibrium Eˆ
equivalent to E such that φˆ1 ≤ −
∑I
i=1m
i.
Proof. We construct an equilibrium E¯ equivalent to E , with identical debt limits for
the agents, in which agent 1 has all the initial endowment of infinitely lived securities.
This can be accomplished by setting for all t ≥ 0, θ¯1t−1 =
∑I
i=1 θ
i
−1, θ¯
i
t−1 = 0 if i > 1,
and a¯it := a
i
t + (qt + dt)(θ
i
t−1 − θ¯
i
t−1) for all i. Showing that E¯ is an AJ-equilibrium
is immediate, since agents have identical wealth levels as in the initial equilibrium,
and only the distribution of this wealth between Arrow securities and infinitely-lived
assets is changed.
For the first part, we construct an equilibrium E˜ equivalent to E¯ , in which agents’
debt limits are φ˜1 = φ1 +m1 −
∑I
i=1m
i, φ˜i = φi +mi for i > 1, and for all i ≥ 1,
a˜i = a¯i+ φ˜i− φ¯i, θ˜i = θ¯i. E˜ is indeed equivalent to E¯ by the equality of agents’ budget
constraints established in Proposition 3.1. The conclusion then follows directly from
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Proposition 4.1, applied to E˜ instead of E .
The second part (the converse) follows from Proposition 4.1, by injecting the
discounted martingale −ε in the price of asset j in the equilibrium E¯ . Indeed, price
of asset j remains positive after the negative martingale injection due to the existing
bubble component, and Proposition 4.1 is valid, as agents’ budgets are identical and
market clearing conditions hold. It should be remarked that a negative martingale
injection in an equilibrium without bubbles would lead to negative prices, unraveling
this argument.
Proposition 4.2 shows that an any AJ-equilibrium can sustain bubbles of arbitrary
size on assets in zero supply. Moreover, it can sustain bubbles equal to the sum of
martingale components in agents’ debt limits on assets in unit supply.
We investigate next the existence of (negative) martingale components in debt
limits for some concrete punishments for default, including the most common penal-
ties used in the literature (see (2.4)) and (2.5)). We consider first a relatively general
situation where penalties for default for each agent are described by some exogenous
nonpositive debt restrictions φ¯i for each agent i. By defaulting at t, the agent has
his debt discharged, in exchange for a “fee” |φ¯it| at t and tighter future debt limits
φ¯i. The penalties φ¯i ≤ 0 can be arbitrarily small in absolute value, or even zero, in
which case we have an interdiction to borrow upon default, (2.5). For example, |φ¯i|
can be taken to be an arbitrary fraction of agent’s i income.
Proposition 4.3. Let (φ¯1, . . . , φ¯I) ∈ −X1×I+ . Consider an AJ-equilibrium E with
debt limits φi ≤ φ¯i ≤ 0, and penalties for default given by V i,dt := V
i
t (φ¯
i
t, φ¯, p, q), for
all i, t. If φi, φ¯i and p satisfy Assumption 3.1 for each i, then E can sustain bubbles
in assets in positive supply if and only if
∑I
i=1(φ
i− φ¯i) 6= 0. Any ε ∈M(p) satisfying
ε
∑I
i=1 θ
i,j
−1 =
∑I
i=1(φ
i − φ¯i) can be injected in asset j as a bubble.
Proof. Theorem 3.5 ensures that for each agent i, the discounted debt limits p · (φi−
φ¯i) are negative martingales. The conclusion follows from Proposition 4.2, since the
penalties for default here do not vary with debt limits and depend on prices only
through the pricing kernel, hence (4.1) holds.
Proposition 4.3 showcases the full power of Theorem 3.5. It shows that under
penalties for default described by some exogenous nonpositive debt limits (φ¯i), an
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equilibrium can sustain bubbles whenever the equilibrium did sustain debt levels
in excess of the penalty levels. In particular, for the interdiction to borrow case
(2.5), agents’ discounted debt limits are martingales, and an equilibrium can sustain
bubbles in assets in positive supply if and only if at least one agent is allowed to
borrow (that is, he is subject to nonzero and nonpositive debt limits).
We analyze now the case when the punishment for default is the interdiction
to trade (2.4). We show that discounted NTT debt limits are submartingales, and
therefore bubble injections resulting in nonpositive debt constraints are possible if
and only if at least one agent has discounted debt bounds with nonzero limit (non-
vanishing discounted debt limits).
Theorem 4.4. Let E be an AJ-equilibrium with penalties (2.4) (no trading after
default). Then for each agent i, p · φi is a submartingale converging a.s. Bubbles
in positive supply assets can be sustained if and only limt→∞ pt
∑I
i=1 φ
i
t 6= 0. Any
ε ∈M(p) satisfying εn
∑I
i=1 θ
i,j
−1 =
1
pn
limt→∞ pt
∑I
i=1 φ
i
t for all n ∈ N can be injected
in asset j as a bubble.
Proof. Fix an agent i and a period t. Agent i will default at period t, when
starting with wealth φit at period t, on the set {ptφ
i
t > Etpt+1φ
i
t+1}. Indeed, let
(c, a) ∈ Cit(φ
i
t, φ
i, p). Construct (c′, a′) ∈ Bit(φ
i
t, φ
i, p) (see (3.1)) given by c′t := e
i
t +(
ptφ
i
t − Etpt+1φ
i
t+1
)
/pt, a
′
t := φ
i
t, and (c
′, a′) ∈ Cit+1(φ
i
t+1, φ
i, p) (hence a′t+1 := φ
i
t+1).
On the set {ptφ
i
t > Etpt+1φ
i
t+1}, c
′
t > e
i
t, and
U it (c
′) = uit(c
′
t) + EtV
i,d
t+1 > u
i
t(e
i
t) + EtV
i,d
t+1 = u
i
t(e
i
t) + EtU
i
t+1(e
i) = V i,dt .
It follows that U it (c
′) > U it (c) = V
i,d
t on the set {ptφ
i
t > Etpt+1φ
i
t+1}, contradicting
the optimality of the path c. Hence ptφ
i
t ≤ Etpt+1φ
i
t+1 for all t and therefore p · φ
is a submartingale. Since φ ≤ 0, the martingale convergence theorem (Kopp 1984,
Theorem 2.6.1) applies, and (ptφ
i
t) converges a.s. to an integrable variable.
For each agent i, let Zi := limt→∞ ptφ
i
t (≤ 0). A simple argument based on
Fatou’s lemma shows that ptφ
i
t ≤ EtZ
i (Kopp 1984, Remark 2.6.5). Define mit :=
−EtZ
i/pt, for all t and i. By construction, m
i ∈ M(p) and φi ≤ −mi. Moreover,∑I
i=1 Z
i 6= 0 if and only if
∑I
i=1m
i 6= 0. The conclusion follows from Proposition
4.2.
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In the next section we introduce a deterministic monetary economy and study
the AJ-equilibria under three types of penalties for default, showing that bubbles
can be sustained in equilibrium.
5 An example
We consider a deterministic economy with two agents {e, o} with endowments alter-
nating between a high and a low value, but with constant aggregate endowment, as
in Woodford (1990), Kocherlakota (1992, Example 1) or Huang and Werner (2000,
Example 7.1). However, here we introduce enforcement limitations.
Agent e (o) has high endowment yH at even (odd) periods, and low endowment
yL at odd (even) periods, with yL < yH . Thus for all t ≥ 0, ee2t = e
o
2t+1 = y
H
and ee2t+1 = e
o
2t = y
L. Agent i ∈ {e, o} faces debt bounds (φit) and has a utility
U i(c) :=
∑
t≥0 ut(ct), where ut(ct) = β
tu(ct), with β ∈ (0, 1) and u is strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable. We assume that there is enough
heterogeneity in agents’ income or that the discount rate β is high enough so that
interest rates at an autarchic equilibrium are low,
βu′(yL)/u′(yH) > 1. (5.1)
The only infinitely-lived asset is fiat money, paying zero dividends and assumed in
unit supply. Each agent i ∈ {e, o} has an initial nonegative endowment of money
θi−1 ≥ 0, and additional wealth (in the form of Arrow securities) a
i
0. We consider
(alternatively) three types of penalties for default V i,d: interdiction to trade (2.4),
interdiction to borrow (2.5), and a temporary, one-period interdiction to trade fol-
lowing default, after which agents are granted a “fresh-start” and receive back their
initial endowment of money,
V i,dt := ut(y
i
t) + V
i
t+1(qt+1θ
i
−1, φ, p),∀t ∈ N. (5.2)
We focus on AJ-equilibria (p, q, (ci), (ai), (φi), (V i,d)) with unvalued money, that is
with q = 0 where, at each period, the agent with low endowment (low-type agent) is
borrowing constrained, while the high endowment agent (high-type agent) is uncon-
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strained. Thus high-type agents always start the period with wealth equal to their
debt limit. We call such equilibria cyclical, since each agent alternates between being
borrowing constrained or not. Using the results of Section 4, we show that (some
of) these equilibria can sustain bubbles, thus they are equivalent to equilibria with
valued money, in which the value of money is limited by the amount of self-enforcing
debt existing in the bubble-free equilibrium.
In any cyclical equilibria, the first order conditions for agent i ∈ {e, o} in the
problem P i(ai0, φ
i, p) (at allocations with positive consumption) are
u′(cit) ≥ βu
′(cit+1)
pt
pt+1
, with “=” if ait+1 > φ
i
t+1. (5.3)
Denote the endowment minus consumption of the high-type agent at period t by xt,
with 0 ≤ xt < y
H . Thus xt represents the transfer from the high-type agent to the
low-type agent at t. Let pit := pt+1/pt be the one-period bond price at t (the price
at t of the Arrow security paying one unit of good at t + 1). Then the first order
conditions (5.3) for the two agents are equivalent to
u′(yH − xt)
βu′(yL + xt+1)
=
pt
pt+1
(
=
1
pit
)
,∀t ≥ 0, (5.4)
u′(yL + xt)
βu′(yH − xt+1)
≥
u′(yH − xt)
βu′(yL + xt+1)
. (5.5)
Notice that (5.5) can be written as
u′(yL + xt)
u′(yH − xt)
≥
u′(yL + (yH − yL − xt+1))
u′(yH − (yH − yL − xt+1))
,
which holds if and only if
xt + xt+1 ≤ y
H − yL. (5.6)
Therefore transfers (xt) and bond prices (pit) are compatible with agents’ first order
conditions if and only if (5.4) and (5.6) are satisfied. Given transfers (xt), pricing
kernels and consumptions are
p0 := 1, pt+1 :=
t∏
s=0
βu′(yL + xs+1)
u′(yH − xs)
; cet := e
e
t − (−1)
txt, c
o
t := e
o
t + (−1)
txt. (5.7)
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We preview the results to follow. When the penalty for default is the interdiction
to trade, there exists a stationary equilibrium characterized by constant transfers
min{x¯, (yH − yL)/2}, where x¯ is the unique strictly positive number satisfying
u(yH − x¯) + βu(yL + x¯) = u(yH) + βu(yL). (5.8)
Moreover, x¯ < (yH − yL)/2 if and only
(1 + β)u((yH + yL)/2) < u(yH) + βu(yL), (5.9)
in which case there is imperfect risk sharing, otherwise perfect risk sharing char-
acterized by constant transfers (yH − yL)/2 obtains.14 In the stationary equilib-
rium, interest rates are high (bond prices are less than 1), and therefore bubbles
cannot be sustained in equilibrium. However, for each initial transfer 0 < x0 <
min{x¯, (yH−yL)/2}, there exists a nonstationary equilibrium (xt) converging mono-
tonically to autarchy, xt ց 0. In all these equilibria, discounted debt limits are
submartingales, and the total credit in the economy equals the equilibrium trans-
fers, xt = −φt, where φt :=
∑
i∈{e,o} φ
i
t. Moreover (ptxt) is a decreasing sequence
with a non-zero limit, and therefore a bubble of maximal initial size limt→∞ ptxt
(= − limt→∞ ptφt) and vanishing asymptotically (due to low interest rates) can be
sustained in all nonstationary equilibria (Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.4).
When the penalty for default is the interdiction to borrow, there exists a unique
stationary equilibrium, characterized by transfers x∗ < min{x¯, (yH − yL)/2} such
that equilibrium interest rates are zero (bond prices are 1),
u′(yH − x∗) = βu′(yL + x∗). (5.10)
As in the previous case, for any initial transfer 0 < x0 < x
∗, there are nonstation-
ary equilibria (xt) converging monotonically to autarchy, xt ց 0. In the stationary
and nonstationary equilibria, discounted debt limits are martingales and xt = −φt
(φt :=
∑
i∈{e,o} φ
i
t). All these equilibria can sustain bubbles of initial size x0 (Propo-
14The inequality in (5.9) can be understood as requiring that the first best symmetric allocation
in which each agent consumes half of the aggregate endowment does not satisfy the participation
constraints of the high type agents.
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sition 4.3), constant in the stationary equilibrium (and equal to x∗) but vanishing
asymptotically in the nonstationary equilibria.
With the temporary interdiction to trade (5.2), we show that there exist stationary
equilibria with even less risk sharing, xˆ < x∗, under parameter conditions where there
would be perfect risk sharing under a permanent interdiction to trade. In such an
equilibrium, interest rates are low, debt limits for the high-type agents are φH < 0
and for the low-type are φL < 0, and discounted debt limits are supermartingales.
Notice that penalties (5.2) satisfy (4.1). Indeed,
V i,dt (p, q + ε, φ
i + θi−1ε) = ut(e
i
t) + V
i
t+1((qt+1 + εt+1)θ
i
−1, φ
i + θi−1ε, p)
= ut(e
i
t) + V
i
t+1(qt+1θ
i
−1, φ
i, p) = V i,dt (p, q, φ
i), (5.11)
where the first and last equality follow from the definition of penalties (5.2), while
the middle equality holds by Proposition 3.1. Therefore by Proposition 4.2, a bubble
of maximal initial size −(φH +φL) and vanishing asymptotically (because of interest
rates greater than 1) can be sustained in equilibrium. It can be shown that −(φH +
φL) < xˆ (< x∗), therefore punishment (5.2) sustains both less risk sharing and
smaller initial bubbles than an interdiction to borrow (in stationary equilibria). The
interdiction to trade, on the other hand, sustains the maximum amount of risk
sharing (perfect risk-sharing for these parameters) and no bubble in a stationary
equilibrium. Therefore the equilibrium amount of risk sharing is not necessarily
comonotonic to the size of the bubble that can be sustained.
5.1 Interdiction to trade
We analyze first the case when the punishment for default is the interdiction to
trade. Alvarez and Jermann (2001) focused only on stationary equilibria with high
interest rates in this environment. Antinolfi, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007) pointed
out that, with initial transfers between agents, in addition to the stationary cyclical
equilibrium, there are an infinite number of nonstationary ones. However, they have
not computed the NTT debt limits supporting these allocations, which is crucial for
understanding whether bubbles can be sustained. We characterize fully these nonsta-
tionary equilibria and show that they can sustain bubbles. This conclusion is robust
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to fixing agents’ initial wealth levels. Indeed, in the supplementary material (Bidian
and Bejan 2012, Section 3), we show that all equilibrium paths (both stationary or
nonstationary) mentioned above can be reached after a one-period transition, from a
zero initial wealth for all agents.15 The NTT conditions (applied to high-type agents)
give
u(yH − xt) + βu(y
L + xt+1) = u(y
H) + βu(yL). (5.12)
We construct sequences (xt) satisfying (5.6) and prices p, trading strategies a
i and
bounds φi supporting the transfers (xt) as an AJ-equilibrium. Let
f(xt, xt+1) := u(y
H) + βu(yL)− u(yH − xt)− βu(y
L + xt+1). (5.13)
Proposition 5.1. Let x¯ be the unique strictly positive solution of f(x¯, x¯) = 0. Choose
x0 such that 0 ≤ x0 ≤ min
{
x¯, y
H−yL
2
}
. There exists a unique sequence (xt)t≥0
satisfying f(xt, xt+1) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, and (xt)t≥0 is strictly decreasing to 0 if
0 < x0 < x¯ and constant if x0 ∈ {0, x¯}. Moreover, (xt) are the transfers from high-
type to low-type agents in a cyclical AJ-equilibrium (p, q, (ci), (ai), (φi), (V i,d)) with
unvalued money (q = 0), outside options V i,d given by (2.4), and for all t ≥ 0, p and
(ci) are given by (5.7), while (ai) and the nonnegative debt limits (φi) satisfy
−aot+1 = a
e
t+1 =
ae0 + L(t)
pt+1
, φe2t = a
e
2t, φ
e
2t+1 =
p2t+2
p2t+1
φe2t+2, φ
o
t = −xt − φ
e
t ,
with L(t) :=
∑t
s=0(−1)
spsxs. Initial wealth levels are a
e
0 := −a
o
0 and a
o
0 is arbitrarily
chosen in the interval [L1, L2], with L1 := limt→∞ L(2t − 1), L2 := limt→∞ L(2t).
Limits L1, L2 exist as (ptxt) is strictly decreasing if x0 > 0, and 0 ≤ L1 ≤ L2.
The proof is given in Appendix B. In all the equilibria constructed in Proposition
5.1, the total self-enforcing amount of credit −(φe+φo) equals the transfers between
agents x, but the actual allocation of debt limits between agents is indeterminate.
This is not surprising, since it is known from proposition 3.1 that martingale compo-
nents added to debt limits leave agents’ budget constraints unchanged if the initial
wealth of the agent is increased by the initial value of the martingale. Therefore the
15With zero initial wealth, there exists an equilibrium in which the transfers from the high-type to
low-type agents are constant after the first period and an infinite number of nonstationary equilibria
converging to autarchy.
30
indeterminacy in debt limits is achieved by varying agents’ initial wealth.
In the stationary equilibrium with constant transfers min
{
x¯, (yH − yL)/2
}
, in-
terest rates are high. Indeed, assume first that x¯ < (yH − yL)/2, which happens if
and only if f¯((yH − yL)/2) > f¯(x¯)(= 0) (f¯(x) = f(x, x)), or equivalently, if and only
if (5.9) holds.16 Bond prices are constant and equal to some pi < 1 as x¯ > x∗ with x∗
given in (5.10), as shown at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 5.1. If, on the
other hand, x¯ ≥ (yH − yL)/2, that is if (5.9) is violated, then the constant sequence
of transfers equal to (yH − yL)/2 (in which consumers get half of the aggregate en-
dowment) leads to equilibrium bond prices equal to β < 1. Thus the present value
of aggregate endowment is finite in the stationary case, and fiat money injections
would lead to positive debt limits, as argued in Section 4.
The next proposition shows that if agents have hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
(HARA) utility functions (Leroy and Werner 2001, p.96), the cyclical nonnstationary
equilibria associated to transfers (xt) constructed in Proposition 5.1 can support
injections of valued fiat money as in Section 4, while preserving the nonpositivity
of the upwardly adjusted debt limits. As shown in Theorem 4.4, the necessary and
sufficient condition for such bubble injections is that the discounted debt limits of at
least one agent do not vanish asymptotically, that is
lim
t→∞
pt(φ
e
t + φ
o
t ) < 0, or equivalently, lim
t→∞
ptxt > 0. (5.14)
Proposition 5.2. Assume that agents have HARA utilities. Any nonstationary
cyclical equilibrium associated to transfers (xt) with 0 < x0 < min
{
x¯, y
H−yL
2
}
and
f(xt, xt+1) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 (as described in Proposition 5.1 ) satisfies (5.14), and
therefore can sustain bubble injections.
Proof. By (5.4) and (B.2),
pt+1xt+1 =
p0
x0
t∏
s=0
xs+1/xs
ps/ps+1
≥
p0
x0
t∏
s=0
u′(yH)/u′(yH − xs)
u′(yL)/u′(yL + xs+1)
.
16In order for (5.1) and (5.9) to hold jointly, β must satisfy
u′(yH)/u′(yL) < β <
(
u(yH)− u((yH + yL)/2)
)
/
(
u((yH + yL)/2)− u(yL)
)
,
and the strict concavity of u guarantees that β belongs to a nonempty interval.
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Assume that agents have HARA utilities u(c) := (α+ γc)1−
1
γ /(γ − 1) defined on
{c | − α < γc}. We assume that α, γ ≥ 0, and therefore any positive consumption
belongs to the allowed domain. As usual, for γ = 1, u(c) := ln(α+ c) and for γ = 0,
u(c) := −e−αc.
For γ > 0 (that is, for power or log utilities),
u′(yH)/u′(yH − xs)
u′(yL)/u′(yL + xs+1)
=
( (
α+ γ(yH − xs)
)
/
(
α+ γyH
)
(α+ γ(yL + xs+1)) / (α+ γyL)
)γ
=
(
1− γxs/(α+ γy
H)
1 + γxs+1/(α+ γyL)
)γ
.
As xt ց 0, there exists t0 ∈ N such that xt ≤ ln 2 for all t ≥ t0. Using the inequalities
ex ≥ 1 + x ∀x ∈ R, e−x < 1− x/2 ∀x ∈ (0, ln 2],
it follows that for all t ≥ t0,
pt+1xt+1
pt0/xt0
≥
t∏
s=t0
e
− 2γxs
α+γyH
−
γxs+1
α+γyL ≥
t∏
s=t0
e
− 3γxs
α+γyL ≥ e
− 3γ
α+γyL
∑∞
s=t0
xs . (5.15)
For γ = 0 (that is, for exponential utility),
pt+1xt+1
p0/x0
=
t∏
s=0
e−α(xs+xs+1) ≥
t∏
s=0
e−2αxs ≥ e−2α
∑∞
s=0 xs . (5.16)
Since xt ց 0, by (B.2) it follows that there exists 0 < l < 1 such that
xt+1
xt
< l for all
t large enough, which implies the convergence of the series
∑
xt. Therefore (ptxt) is
bounded away from zero, hence lim ptxt > 0, by (5.15) and (5.16).
Therefore we showed that for a large class of utility functions the discounted total
debt limits do not vanish in the nonstationary AJ-equilibria, and therefore bubbles
can be sustained in equilibrium. The HARA utility assumption in Proposition 5.2
simplifies the proof, and it can likely be relaxed.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, each non-autarchic cyclical equi-
librium described in Proposition 5.1 requires specific non-zero initial wealth for the
agents. However, in Bidian and Bejan (2012, Section 3), we show that all such cycli-
cal equilibrium paths can be reached after a one-period transition, when all agents
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start with predetermined, zero wealth.
5.2 Interdiction to borrow
The case where agents are not allowed to borrow after default was discussed also
in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009b), who show that from any initial level of transfers
x0 less than x
∗ given by (5.10), there exist a unique sequence of transfers xt ց 0
forming an equilibrium, as long as agents’ period utility u has a coefficient of risk
aversion less than one (on consumption levels below the aggregate endowment). We
establish that these results hold also for utilities with coefficients of relative risk
aversion higher than one.
The martingale property of NTT bounds guaranteed by Theorem 3.5,17 that is the
fact that ptφ
i
t = pt+1φ
i
t+1 for all i and t, simplifies the task of characterizing cyclical
equilibria. Indeed, consider a cyclical AJ-equilibrium (p, q, (ci), (ai), (φi), (V i,d)) with
q = 0 and outside options V i,d given by (2.5). Let φt := φ
e
t + φ
o
t . If agent i is the
high-type at t, his budget constraint gives (j ∈ {e, o} \ {i} being the low-type at t)
xt = y
H − cit = −φ
i
t +
pt+1
pt
ait+1 = −φ
i
t +
pt+1
pt
(−φjt+1) = −φ
i
t − φ
j
t = −φt. (5.17)
It follows that xt = −φt for all t, as it was the case for the equilibria in Proposition
5.1, (where agents were not allowed to trade after default). Therefore for all t ≥ 0,
ptxt = pt+1xt+1, or equivalently, xt+1 = xt/pit. By (5.4), h(xt, pit) = 0, where
h(x, pi) :=
u′(yH − x)
βu′(yL + x/pi)
−
1
pi
. (5.18)
Proposition 5.3. Let x∗ be given by (5.10) (equivalently, x∗ is the unique solution
of h(x∗, 1) = 0). Choose x0 such that 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x
∗. Assume that the utility u
has a coefficient of relative risk aversion less than 1 + yL/x∗ for consumption in
the interval [yL, yL + yH ]. Then there are unique sequences (xt)t≥0 and (pit)t≥0 such
that h(xt, pit) = 0 and xt+1 = xt/pit for all t ≥ 0. When x0 = x
∗ then xt = x
∗
and pit = 1 for all t. When x0 = 0 then xt = 0 and pit = βu
′(yL)/u′(yH) for all
t. When 0 < x0 < x
∗ then xt ց 0 and pit ր βu
′(yL)/u′(yH). The sequences (xt)
17Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, as debt limits bind in bounded time (in at most 2 periods).
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and (pit) represent the transfers from high-type to low-type agents and bond prices in
a cyclical AJ-equilibrium (p, q, (ci), (ai), (φi), (V i,d)) with unvalued money (q = 0),
outside options V i,d given by (2.5), and for all t ≥ 0, p and (ci) are given by (5.7),
while (ai) and the nonnegative debt limits (φi) satisfy
ae2t := −
ao0
p2t
, ae2t+1 :=
x0 − a
o
0
p2t+1
, aot+1 := −a
e
t+1; φ
e
t := −
ao0
pt
, φot := −xt − φ
e
t .
The initial wealth ao0 of the odd agent is arbitrarily chosen in the interval [0, x0].
The proof is given in Appendix B. Proposition 5.3 constructs a class of nonsta-
tionary cyclical equilibria converging to autarchy. Autarchy is also an equilibrium,
characterized by zero transfers xt = 0 for all t. Additionally, there exists a stationary
equilibrium with transfers xt = x
∗ for all t, which allows less risk sharing than the
stationary equilibrium of Proposition 5.1 where agents were not allowed to trade
after default (characterized by transfers xt = x¯ for all t). Indeed, as shown at the
beginning of the proof of Proposition 5.1, x∗ < x¯. This is in line with the intuition
that a more severe punishment for default would facilitate the extension of credit
and let agents smooth consumption better. As in the case of an interdiction to trade
as punishment for default, in all the equilibria uncovered in Proposition 5.3 the total
self-enforcing amount of credit −(φe+φo) that arises endogenously equals the trans-
fers between agents x, but the actual split of debt allowances (limits) between agents
depends on their initial wealth, which can take arbitrary values in some interval.
By Proposition 4.3, bubble injections of maximal initial size −φ0 = x0 are possi-
ble in each of the equilibria of Proposition 5.3. Thus only the autarchic equilibrium
cannot sustain bubbles. Notice also that all cyclical AJ-equilibrium allocations de-
scribed in Proposition 5.3 can be achieved from a zero initial wealth for the agents.
5.3 Temporary interdiction to trade
We relax the complete interdiction from trade as punishment for default, and we
assume that the penalty for default is (5.2). In a bubble-free equilibrium (that is,
with unvalued money), (5.2) coincides with the penalty analyzed in Azariadis and
Kaas (2008), where after default agents are excluded from access to financial markets
for one period. In line with their findings, we show that this mild punishment can
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guarantee steady state partial risk sharing even under parameter conditions where
full risk sharing would obtain under a permanent interdiction to trade after default.
New to this paper are conditions under which these steady state equilibria allow
for even less risk sharing than an interdiction to borrow, and therefore where low
interest rates prevail. Moreover, we characterize the NTT debt limits, showing that
they are supermartingales on a subsequence (when discounted by the pricing kernel),
and that bubbles can be sustained in equilibrium. Under mild additional parametric
assumptions, we prove that the discounted debt limits are in fact supermartingales.
As before, we focus on cyclical equilibria with unvalued money. Let at > 0 be the
beginning of period t wealth of a low-type at t. Thus pitat+1 represents the savings
of a high type at t. Let also φHt := −a
t be the debt limit at t of a high-type at t,
and φLt the debt limit of a low-type. Assume that agent i is the high-type at t. He
is indifferent between defaulting or not at t, since ait = −at = φ
i
t. The monotonicity
property (3.8) implies that debt limits bind at t+ 2 in the problem P it+1(0, φ
i, p) (if
the agent i defaults at t), since they are binding in the problem P it+1(a
i
t+1, φ
i, p) and
ait+1 = at+1 > 0. It follows that
ut(y
H − xt) + ut+1(y
L + xt+1) + V
i,d
t+2 = ut(y
H) + ut+1(y
L − pit+1φ
i
t+2) + V
i,d
t+2. (5.19)
Either agent’s budget constraint at t gives
xt = at + pitat+1. (5.20)
With this notation, (5.19) becomes
u(yH − xt) + βu(y
L + xt+1) = u(y
H) + βu(yL + pit+1at+2). (5.21)
Any positive sequences of transfers (xt) and asset holdings (at) (for low types in
the corresponding period) satisfying the difference equations (5.20)-(5.21) and (5.6),
bond prices (pit) given by (5.4), debt limits φ
H
t = −at for the high-type at t and some
φLt < 0 for the low-type at t form an equilibrium, as long as φ
L
t satisfies the NTT
condition. Indeed, the participation constraints of low types are clearly satisfied,
since their beginning of period wealth is positive, and they are subject to identical
debt limits upon reentering the market following default.
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We focus on non-autarchic stationary equilibria with imperfect risk-sharing, thus
we look for solutions (xt), (at) of (5.20) and (5.21) such that xt = xˆ ∈ (0, (y
H−yL)/2),
at = aˆ and pit = pˆi, where pˆi = pi(xˆ) := βu
′(yL + xˆ)/u′(yH − xˆ). Debt limits of a
high-type are φH := −aˆ and of a low type are some φL < 0. The transfer xˆ must be
a zero of the function
g(x) := u(yH) + βu
(
yL +
pi(x)
1 + pi(x)
x
)
− u(yH − x)− βu(yL + x). (5.22)
We assume that (x∗ is given by (5.10))
u(yH − x∗) + βu(yL + x∗) > u(yH) + βu(yL + x∗/2). (5.23)
Notice that u(yH − x∗) + βu(yL + x∗) > (1 + β)u
(
(yH + yL)/2
)
and
u(yH) + βu(yL + x∗/2) < u(yH) + βu
(
yL + (yH − yL)/4
)
.
Therefore sufficient conditions for (5.23) consist in a strengthening of (5.1) to
β >
u(yH)− u
(
(yH + yL)/2
)
u ((yH + yL)/2)− u (yL + (yH − yL)/4)
, (5.24)
and requiring that u is concave enough so that β can be chosen less than 1,
u
(
(yH + yL)/2
)
− u
(
yL + (yH − yL)/4
)
> u(yH)− u
(
(yH + yL)/2
)
. (5.25)
Proposition 5.4. Assume that (5.23) holds (sufficient conditions are (5.24)-(5.25)).
There exists a stationary AJ-equilibrium with transfers xˆ ∈ (0, x∗) such that g(xˆ) =
0, bond prices pˆi := βu′(yL + xˆ)/u′(yH − xˆ) > 1, pricing kernel pt+1 := pˆi
t for all
t ≥ 0 (and p0 = 1), and beginning of period asset holdings −aˆ := −xˆ/(1+pˆi) and debt
limits φH := −aˆ < 0 for the high-type, respectively aˆ and φL < 0 for the low-type.
Moreover, φL > pˆiφH , that is ptφ
L > pt+1φ
H , for all t. A sufficient condition for
φH ≥ pˆiφL to hold, that is for ptφ
H ≥ pt+1φ
L to be true, is
u(yL − aˆ/pˆi + pˆiaˆ)− u(yL) ≥ βu′(yH − xˆ)aˆ, (5.26)
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0xˆ 1
2
g(x)
Figure 2: Numerical example: yL = 1, yH = 2, β = 0.99, u(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ
with γ = 3 .
which therefore guarantees that agents’ discounted debt limits are supermartingales.
The proof is in Appendix B. As pt ր ∞ and φ
L, φH > 0, Proposition 4.3
guarantees that bubbles of initial size −(φH+φL) can be sustained. From φL > pˆiφH
and (5.20),
−(φH + φL) < −φH − pˆiφH = xˆ (< x∗),
therefore punishment (5.2) sustains both less risk sharing and smaller initial bubbles
than an interdiction to borrow (in the stationary equilibrium).
The equilibrium in Proposition 5.4 is described without having a general analytic
solution for xˆ, the zero of g(x) in the interval (0, x∗). To show that there exist
parameters that jointly satisfy (5.23) and (5.26), we explore a numerical example.
Example 5.1
As a numerical illustration, let yL = 1, yH = 2, β = 0.99, u(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ
with γ = 3.
Function g is represented in Figure 2. It follows that x∗ ≈ 0.497 and the chosen
parameters satisfy (5.23). The equilibrium transfers, prices and asset holdings are
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xˆ ≈ 0.427, pˆi ≈ 1.326 and aˆ ≈ 0.184, thus (5.26) is satisfied. The debt limits of the
low-type are obtained from (B.4), by computing V it+1(0, φ
i, p), with agent i being the
high-type at t+ 1. By (3.8), agent i is a saver at t+ 1 in the problem P it+1(0, φ
i, p),
since he is a saver at t+1 in the problem P it+1(aˆ, φ
i, 0). Let (c, a) ∈ Cit+1(0, φ
i, p). We
guess, and then verify, that agent i is borrowing-constrained at period t + 2 (when
he is low-type) in the problem P it+1(0, φ
i, p). If this is the case, the Euler equation
and budgets constraints imply that u′(ct+1)/u
′(ct+2) = β/pˆi, ct+1 + pˆict+2 − pˆi
2aˆ =
yH + pˆiyL. It follows that ct+1 ≈ 2 − 0.344, and ct+2 ≈ 1 + 0.503. We can confirm
that our guess was correct, and the agent is indeed borrowing constrained at t + 2,
as u′(ct+2)/u
′(yH − xˆ) ≥ β/pˆi. Therefore (B.4) rewrites as
u(yL + φH + pˆiaˆ) + β(u(yH − xˆ) + βu(yL + xˆ)) = u(yL) + β(u(ct+1) + βu(ct+2)),
from which we get φL ≈ −0.197. The debt limits of the high type are given by φH =
−aˆ ≈ −0.184. As φL > pˆiφH and φH > pˆiφL, agents’ debt limits are supermartingales
when discounted by the pricing kernel (pt+1 = pˆi
t). Therefore the maximum initial
size of a bubble that can be sustained in equilibrium is −φL − φH = 0.381.
With this parametric values, we contrast the equilibrium here with the equilibria
of Propositions 5.1/5.3 for an interdiction to trade/borrow. Notice that (5.9) does
not hold, therefore under an interdiction to trade there is perfect risk sharing in a
stationary equilibrium, with transfers 1
2
from high-types to low-types. Interest rates
are high and bubbles cannot exist. In a nonstationary equilibrium with an initial
value x0 = 0.499 (close to the stationary level of transfers), limt→∞ ptxt ≈ 0.244,
which represents also the maximal initial size of a bubble that can be sustained
(from the initial level of transfers x0 = 0.499). Thus an interdiction to trade gener-
ates (initial) smaller bubbles than a temporary interdiction to trade, which in turn
are smaller than under an interdiction to borrow. Indeed, under an interdiction to
borrow, maximal initial size of a bubble is x∗ ≈ 0.497 in the stationary equilibrium,
or some x0 (which can be arbitrarily close to x
∗) in the nonstationary equilibrium
with initial transfers x0. The amount of (initial) risk sharing however is maximal
under an interdiction to trade, followed by an interdiction to borrow, and then by
a temporary interdiction to trade. Thus amounts of risk sharing allowed by differ-
ent penalties are not necessarily comonotonic with the size of bubbles that can be
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sustained.
6 Conclusion
We build a theory of rational bubbles that jointly predicts their size (limited by the
amount of self-enforcing debt in the system), conditions favoring them (unnecessarily
tight credit restriction given the underlying contractual and enforcement limitations),
and a potential disconnect between the real and financial side of an economy (as
the real side is unaffected by bubbles). The setup is an infinite horizon, complete
markets economy, in which agents have the option to default on debt at any period
in exchange for a continuation utility that can be date and state contingent, and can
depend on the pricing kernel.
For an agent facing a given pricing kernel and penalty for default, we characterize
the set of debt limits that allow for maximum credit expansion while preventing de-
fault, a` la Alvarez and Jermann (2000), known as “not-too-tight” (NTT) debt limits.
We show that two discounted NTT debt limits for an agent facing a given pricing ker-
nel must differ by a martingale. Our characterization is crucial for showing that the
tighter bounds resulting from the injection of a bubble using Kocherlakota’s (2008)
mechanism can remain nonpositive, despite the bubble component they contain. In-
deed, if agents are still allowed to borrow predetermined fixed fractions (arbitrarily
small and possibly zero) of their endowments upon default, an equilibrium can sus-
tain bubbles (on assets in unit supply) equal to the total debt limits in excess of
the penalty levels. When the punishment for default is the interdiction to borrow,
respectively trade, discounted NTT debt limits of each agent are martingales, respec-
tively submartingales, and bubbles of initial size equal with the value, respectively
asymptotic value, of total debt limits can be sustained.
We illustrate the sustainability of bubbles in an example in which we compute
the equilibria under three types of penalties: permanent or temporary (one-period)
interdiction to trade, or interdiction to borrow. The temporary interdiction to trade
gives rise to discounted debt limits that are supermartingales. The example reveals
that the size of bubbles is not necessarily co-monotonic with the amount of risk
sharing that can be sustained in equilibrium, and that equilibria supporting bubbles
are not always constrained inefficient.
39
Thus economies with endogenous (NTT) debt limits provide robust examples of
bubbles, in the presence of fully rational, forward looking agents. Bejan and Bidian
(2012) point out that bubble injections can occur also with incomplete markets.
They also show that bubbles can lead to increases in the volume of trade and can
explain a large number of asset pricing puzzles.
A Omitted proofs in Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. It is enough to prove that a′t+1 ≥ at+1 and the conclusion follows by iteration.
If c′t < ct, then on {a
′
t+1 > φt+1} it must be that a
′
t+1 ≤ at+1, as Vt+1 is strictly
concave by standard arguments and the first order conditions are (we drop the fixed
arguments p, φ in the indirect utility function)
u′t(c
′
t)
V ′t+1(a
′
t+1)
=
pt
pt+1
≤
u′t(ct)
V ′t+1(at+1)
.
Moreover, on {a′t+1 = φt+1}, φt+1 = a
′
t+1 ≤ at+1, thus a
′
t+1 ≤ at+1. This contradicts
at ≤ a
′
t, as
at = ct + Et
pt+1
pt
at+1 − et > c
′
t + Et
pt+1
pt
a′t+1 − et = a
′
t.
We proved that c′t ≥ ct. Clearly a
′
t+1 ≥ at+1 on the set {at+1 = φt=1}. On {at+1 >
φt=1}, agent’s first order conditions are
u′t(ct)
V ′t+1(at+1)
=
pt
pt+1
≤
u′t(c
′
t)
V ′t+1(a
′
t+1)
,
implying that a′t+1 ≥ at+1, as required.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. Let (c, a) ∈ Ct(φt, φ, p). Aggregation of agent’s budget constraints gives
Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pscs = Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pses + ptφt − Etpηnφηn − Etpηn (aηn − φηn) . (A.1)
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Using the inequality u′(x)x ≤ u(x)− u(0) ≤ u¯− u and letting U¯ :=
pt(u¯−u)Et
∑
s≥t βs
βtu′(ct)
,
0 < Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pscs =
pt
βtu′(ct)
· Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
βsu
′(cs)cs ≤ U¯ <∞. (A.2)
Since (c, a) ∈ Ct(φt, φ, p), by the transversality condition (Bidian and Bejan 2012,
Lemma 1.1),
lim
n→∞
Etpηn (aηn − φηn) = lim
n→∞
Etpn (an − φn)1n<α(t) (A.3)
= lim
n→∞
pt
u′t(ct)
Etu
′
n(cn)(an − φn)1n<α(t) ≤
pt
u′t(ct)
Etu
′
n(cn)(an − φn) = 0.
From (A.1)-(A.3),
−ptφt + lim
n→∞
Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pscs = lim
n→∞
(
Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pses − Etpηnφηn
)
≤ U¯ − ptφt. (A.4)
It follows that
Et
α(t)−1∑
s=t
pses := lim
n→∞
Et
ηn−1∑
s=t
pses ≤ U¯ − ptφt + sup
n≥t
Etpηnφηn <∞.
Moreover, (A.1) in conjunction with (A.2)-(A.3) show that infn≥tEtpηnφηn > −∞,
and therefore (since supn≥tEt(pηnφηn)
+ <∞)
sup
n≥t
Et (pηnφηn)
− <∞. (A.5)
At any period s ∈ N, since Bs(φs, φ, p) 6= ∅, the agent can consume at least 0 if
his beginning of period s wealth is φs and he faces the bounds φ. Thus psφs+pses ≥
Esps+1φs+1. It follows that
(
psφs + Es
∑α(t)−1
n=s pnen
)α(t)
s=t
is supermartingale, which
converges by (A.5) (Kopp 1984, Corollary 2.6.2). Therefore (pηnφηn)n converges
a.s. Similarly,
(
psφ¯s + Es
∑α(t)−1
n=s pnen
)α(t)
s=t
is a supermartingale and we infer that
(pηnφ¯ηn)n converges a.s. Hence (Mηn)n converges a.s.
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B Omitted proofs in Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof. An analysis of the function f¯(x) := f(x, x) reveals that it is convex (as sum
of convex functions), f¯(0) = 0 and f¯(yH − yL) > 0. Moreover f¯ ′(x) = u′(yH − x)−
βu′(yL + x), and therefore f¯ ′ is strictly increasing. Notice that f¯ ′((yH − yL)/2) > 0,
and, by (5.1), f¯ ′(0) < 0. Therefore there exists a unique x∗ ∈
(
0, y
H−yL
2
)
such that
f¯ ′(x∗) = 0, that is, x∗ satisfies (5.10). The function f¯ decreases strictly up to x∗ and
then increases strictly. It follows that there exists a (unique) x¯ ∈ (x∗, yH − yL), such
that f¯(x¯) = f(x¯, x¯) = 0.
Given 0 < xt < x¯, since f(xt, 0) > 0, f(xt, xt) = f¯(xt) < 0 and f(xt, ·) is
strictly decreasing, it follows that the equation f(xt, xt+1) = 0 has a unique solution
xt+1, which moreover satisfies 0 < xt+1 < xt. Therefore the sequence (xt) satisfying
f(xt, xt+1) = 0 for all t is strictly decreasing if 0 < x0 < x¯. Moreover, the continuity
of f implies that f(limxt, lim xt) = f¯(lim xt) = 0, and thus limxt = 0. If xt ∈ {0, x¯},
then the solution of f(xt, xt+1) = 0 is xt+1 = xt, thus (xt) is constant if x0 ∈ {0, x¯}.
Construct the prices (pt) starting from p0 := 1 and using (5.4). The participation
constraints of high-type agents are satisfied by the construction of the sequence (xt).
The continuation utilities of low-type agents at a period t exceed the autarchy levels
(autarchy being the outside option) since they receive a positive transfer xt > 0 at
t, and starting from t + 1 they will receive a continuation utility equal to autarchy
(since they will be high-type next period). The first order condition of the low-type
agents are satisfied since (5.6) holds. Indeed, xt + xt+1 ≤ 2xt ≤ y
H − yL.
From the agents’ budgets constraints, the asset holdings supporting the desired
transfers (xt), taking as given the initial wealth a
i
0 of each agent i are a
e
t+1 = a
e
0 +
L(t)/pt+1, for all t ≥ 0, and a
o = −ae. The asset holdings of the high-type agents
equal their debt limits, and therefore φe2t = a
e
2t, φ
o
2t+1 = a
o
2t+1, for all t ≥ 0. To
determine φe2t+1, let (c
′, a′) ∈ Ce2t+1(φ
e
2t+1, φ
e, p). The debt constraints of the even
agent are binding at 2t+2 along the path a′, since they bind at 2t+2 on the path a,
and his wealth at 2t+ 1 on path a is higher than on path a′ (ae2t+1 ≥ φ
e
2t+1 = a
′
2t+1).
Thus a′2t+2 = φ
e
2t+2 and V
e,d
2t+1 = V
e
2t+1(φ
e
2t+1, φ
e, p) = u2t+1(c
′
2t+1) + V
e,d
2t+2. As the
penalty for default is autarchy, V e,d2t+1 = u2t+1(y
L) + V e,d2t+2, and therefore c
′
2t+1 = y
L.
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Since p2t+1c
′
2t+1 + p2t+2a
′
2t+2 = p2t+1y
L + p2t+1φ
e
2t+1, we infer that
p2t+1φ
e
2t+1 = p2t+2a
′
2t+2 = p2t+2φ
e
2t+2. (B.1)
Similarly, p2tφ
o
2t = p2t+1φ
o
2t+1. Notice that for all t ≥ 0, φ
e
t + φ
o
t = xt, since
φe2t + φ
o
2t = a
e
2t −
p2t+1
p2t
ae2t+1 = −
(−1)2tp2tx2t
p2t
= −x2t,
φe2t+1 + φ
o
2t+1 =
p2t+2
p2t+1
ae2t+2 − a
e
2t+1 =
(−1)2t+1p2t+1x2t+1
p2t+1
= −x2t+1.
Next we determine the restrictions needed on the initial wealth of the agents such
that the debt bounds are nonpositive. This is clearly the case when xt = 0 for all
t (the autarchic equilibrium), since asset holdings and debt bounds are zero. For
non-autarchic equilibria, that is for nonzero sequences (xt), by (5.12) and the strict
concavity of u,
u′(yH − xt)xt > u(y
H)− u(yH − xt) = β
(
u(yL + xt+1)− u(y
L)
)
> βu′(yL + xt+1)xt+1
u′(yH)xt < u(y
H)− u(yH − xt) = β
(
u(yL + xt+1)− u(y
L)
)
< βu′(yL)xt+1.
Therefore by (5.4),
pt
pt+1
=
u′(yH − xt)
βu′(yL + xt+1)
>
xt+1
xt
>
u′(yH)
βu′(yL)
. (B.2)
It follows that ptxt > pt+1xt+1, and therefore the sequence (ptxt) is strictly decreasing.
Thus for i ∈ {e, o}, the sequences (ptφ
i
t) are nondecreasing, hence p · φ
e and p · φo
are indeed submartingales, in agreement to Theorem 4.4. As a consequence, the
necessary and sufficient condition for φi ≤ 0 is limt→∞ ptφ
i
t ≤ 0. Notice that
lim
t→∞
ptφ
o
t = lim
t→∞
p2t+1a
o
2t+1 = a
o
0 − L2, lim
t→∞
ptφ
e
t = lim
t→∞
p2ta
e
2t = −a
o
0 + L1.
The limits L1 := limt→∞
∑2t−1
s=0 (−1)
spsxs and L2 := limt→∞
∑2t
s=0(−1)
spsxs are well-
defined and L1 ≤ L2, since (ptxt) is decreasing. Therefore limt→∞ ptφ
o
t ≤ 0 and
limt→∞ ptφ
o
t ≤ 0 if and only if L1 ≤ a
o
0 ≤ L2.
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For the given net savings, prices, trading strategies and debt limits to form an
AJ-equilibrium, all that is left is to check the (necessary and) sufficient transversality
conditions. They are clearly satisfied, as for i ∈ {e, o},
lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)(a
i
t − φ
i
t) ≤ lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)
(∑
i
ait −
∑
i
φit
)
= lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)xt = 0. (B.3)
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. For each pi > 0, h(·, pi) is continuous and strictly decreasing in x. Moreover,
for each pi ∈ [1, βu′(yL)/u′(yH)], h(0, pi) ≤ 0 and h(x∗, pi) ≥ 0, and therefore there
exists a unique x(pi) ∈ [0, x∗] such that h(x(pi), pi) = 0. In particular, x(1) = x∗ and
x(βu′(yL)/u′(yH)) = 0. By the implicit function theorem,
x′(pi) =
1
pi2
u′(yH − x(pi)) ·
(
piu′(yL + x(pi)/pi) + u′′(yL + x(pi)/pi)x(pi)
)
u′(yL + x(pi)/pi) · u′′(yH − x(pi)) + u′(yH − x(pi)) · u′′(yL + x(pi)/pi)/pi
.
The denominator in the right hand side of the above equation is negative, and
piu′(yL + x(pi)/pi) + u′′(yL + x(pi)/pi)x(pi) =
= piu′(yL + x(pi)/pi)
(
1−
−u′′(yL + x(pi)/pi)
u′(yL + x(pi)/pi)
(yL + x(pi)/pi)
x(pi)/pi
yL + x(pi)/pi
)
.
By the assumption on the coefficient of relative risk aversion of u,
−u′′(yL + x(pi)/pi)
u′(yL + x(pi)/pi)
(yL + x(pi)/pi)
x(pi)/pi
yL + x(pi)/pi
≤
x∗ + yL
x∗
x(pi)/pi
yL + x(pi)/pi
≤ 1,
with strict inequalities if pi ∈ (1, βu′(yL)/u′(yH)).
Therefore x(·) is strictly decreasing. The sequences (xt), (pit) are determined
starting from x0 and using pit = x
−1(xt) and xt+1 = xt/pit. When x0 = x
∗ it follows
that pi0 = 1, hence xt = x
∗ and pit = 1 for all t. When x0 = 0 it follows that pi0 =
βu′(yL)/u′(yH), hence xt = 0 and pit = βu
′(yL)/u′(yH) for all t. When 0 < x0 < x
∗
then xt ց 0 and pit ր βu
′(yL)/u′(yH), it follows that pi0 ∈ (1, βu
′(yL)/u′(yH)),
therefore x1 = x0/pi0 < x0, pi1 = x
−1(x1) > x
−1(x0) = pi0, and it follows immediately
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that xt ց 0 and pit ր βu
′(yL)/u′(yH).
We verify now that (p, (ci), (ai), (φi), (V i,d)) is an AJ-equilibrium sustaining the
transfers (xt) and bond prices (pit). The first order conditions of the unconstrained
agents (high-type) are satisfied by construction, since h(xt, pit) = 0. The first order
conditions of the borrowing constrained agents (low-type) are satisfied since (5.6)
holds, because xt + xt+1 ≤ 2x
∗ ≤ yH − yL. Agents’ transversality conditions can be
checked as in (B.3), while their budget constraints are satisfied by the construction
of the debt limits φo, φe (see (5.17)). Agents’ participation constraints are satisfied
since p · φo, p · φe are constant (martingales), and hence NTT.
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof. Notice that g(0) = 0, g′(0) = (u′(yH))2/(u′(yH)+βu′(yL)) > 0, and g(x∗) < 0,
by (5.22), hence there exists xˆ ∈ (0, x∗) such that g(xˆ) = 0. For any φL < 0, transfers
xˆ, asset holdings aˆ, bond prices pˆi, and debt limits φH = −aˆ for high-types satisfy
market clearing conditions, the first order conditions (5.4) and (5.5) (or equivalently,
(5.6)), and the transversality conditions, since
lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)(a
i
t − φ
i
t) ≤ lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)(
∑
i
ait −
∑
i
φit) = lim
t→∞
βtu′(cit)(−φ
L − φH) = 0.
Moreover, φH satisfies by construction the NTT condition (for a high-type agent),
irrespective of φL < 0. All that is left is to establish the existence of a φL < 0 that
satisfies the NTT condition (for a low-type agent).
Assume that i is the low-type agent at t. If φi were NTT, V it (φ
L, φi, p) = V i,dt . By
the monotonicity property (3.8), debt limits bind at t+1 in the problem P it (φ
L, φi, p)
since they bind in the problem P it (aˆ, φ
i, p). It follows that a necessary and sufficient
condition for φi to be NTT is that φL satisfies
ut(y
L + φL + pˆiaˆ) + V it+1(−aˆ, φ
i, p) = ut(y
L) + V it+1(0, φ
i, p). (B.4)
Let ζ(φL) := ut(y
L + φL + pˆiaˆ) + V it+1(−aˆ, φ
i, p)− ut(y
L)− V it+1(0, φ
i, p). Notice that
for any φL < 0, V it+1(−aˆ, φ
i, p) = βt+1(u(yH − xˆ) + βu(yL + xˆ))/(1− β2) and it does
not depend on φL. Moreover, V it+1(0, φ
i, p) is nonincreasing in φL. Therefore ζ is
strictly increasing in the domain R−. Concavity of V it+1 in the first argument and
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the envelope theorem imply
ζ(φL) ≥ ut(y
L + φL + pˆiaˆ)− ut(y
L)−
∂V it+1(−aˆ, φ
i, p)
∂a
· aˆ
= ut(y
L + φL + pˆiaˆ)− ut(y
L)− u′t+1(y
H − xˆ) · aˆ,
where the partial derivative refers to the first argument. Therefore
β−tζ(φL) ≥ u(yL + φL + pˆiaˆ)− u(yL)− βu′(yH − xˆ) · aˆ. (B.5)
As yL + pˆiaˆ < yL + (1 + pˆi)aˆ = yL + xˆ,
u(yL + pˆiaˆ)− u(yL) > u′(yL + pˆiaˆ) · pˆiaˆ > u′(yL + xˆ) · pˆiaˆ = βu′(yH − xˆ) · aˆ.
Therefore by (B.5), ζ(0) > 0. It is immediate to see that ζ(−pˆiaˆ) < 0. As a
consequence, there exists a unique φL < 0 satisfying (B.4). Moreover, φL > pˆiaˆ. In
fact, if (5.26) holds, ζ(−pˆiaˆ) > 0 and therefore φL ≤ −a/pˆi, or equivalently φH ≥ pˆiφL.
Thus under (5.26), discounted debt limits are supermartingales.
C Efficiency of the equilibria of Section 5
In order to discuss the efficiency of the equilibria constructed in Proposition 5.1,
we introduce first some definitions. An allocation c = (ce, co) ∈ XI+ is feasible if
cet+c
o
t = e
e
t+e
o
t (= y
H+yL) for all t, and individually rational if U it (c
i) ≥ U it (e
i), for all
t ∈ N and i ∈ {e, o}. An allocation c¯ Pareto dominates allocation c if U i(c¯e) ≥ U e(ce)
for i ∈ {e, o}, with at least one strict inequality. A feasible and individually rational
allocation c is constrained inefficient if it is Pareto dominated by another feasible
and incentive rational allocation c¯ (Alvarez and Jermann 2000). An allocation c is
ex-post inefficient if it is Pareto dominated by an allocation c¯ satisfying U it (c¯
i) ≥
U it (c
i) and
∑
i c¯
i
t ≤
∑
i c
i
t, for all t ∈ N and i ∈ {e, o}. Conversely, an allocation is
constrained efficient (respectively ex-post efficient), if it is not constrained inefficient
(respectively ex-post inefficient). Notice that a feasible and individually rational
allocation which is ex-post inefficient is always constrained inefficient.
Each nonstationary equilibrium of Proposition 5.1 associated to a sequence of
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transfers xt → 0 has the property that (by (5.4))
pt+1
pt
→
βu′(yL)
u′(yH)
> 1,
and therefore it satisfies the “modified Cass criterion”, which is a sufficient condition
for ex-post inefficiency (Bloise and Reichlin 2011, Lemma 2). Therefore all the non-
stationary equilibria constructed in Proposition 5.1 are also constrained inefficient.
By contrast, the stationary equilibrium is always constrained efficient. Indeed, if
(5.9) is violated, the stationary equilibrium associated to transfers (yH − yL)/2 is
actually Pareto optimal. If, instead, (5.9) holds, then in the stationary equilibrium
associated to transfers x¯, by (5.4) and (B.2),
pt+1
pt
=
βu′(yL + x¯)
u′(yH − x¯)
< 1.
Therefore the stationary equilibrium violates the “weak modified Cass criterion”,
which is a necessary condition for constrained inefficiency (Bloise and Reichlin 2011,
Lemma 3). Based on this example, it is tempting to equate equilibrium low interest
rates with inefficiency of the equilibrium. This would imply that bubbles, which
require low interest rates, can only exist in inefficient equilibria. However the equiv-
alence between efficiency of an equilibrium and the presence of high interest rates is
not true in general and is a consequence of the stationarity of agents’ endowments, as
pointed out by Bloise and Reichlin (2011, Appendix B). They construct an efficient
stationary equilibrium with low interest rates, in a framework similar to ours, but
with nonstationary endowments.
We investigate in what follows the efficiency of the equilibria constructed in
Propositions 5.3 and 5.4. The penalties for default now depend on endogenous
equilibrium variables such as prices and debt limits, and therefore a definition of
constrained inefficiency is not obvious. Following Bloise and Reichlin (2011), we say
that an allocation c = (ce, co) ∈ XI+ is individually rational given reservation utilities
ν = (νe, νo) ∈ XI if U it (c
i) ≥ νit , for all t ∈ N and i ∈ {e, o}. A feasible allocation
c is constrained inefficient given some reservation utilities ν ∈ X i if it is Pareto
dominated by an allocation c¯ which is feasible and individually rational given the
reservation utilities ν. The nonstationary equilibria of Proposition 5.3 and the sta-
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tionary equilibrium of Proposition 5.4 are ex-post inefficient, by the modified Cass
criterion, as bond prices pt+1/pt > 1 for large enough t (for all t for the equilib-
rium of Proposition 5.4).18 The stationary equilibrium of Proposition 5.3, associated
to constant transfers x∗ and zero interest rates (constant pricing kernel), is not con-
strained inefficient given reservation utilities (V i,d)i∈{e,o} satisfying (2.5) (interdiction
to borrow after default). This follows using an identical argument to the one used
by Bloise and Reichlin (2011, Appendix B, Claims 5 and 7).
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